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Abstract. We formally treat cryptographic constructions based on the hardness of deciding ideal
membership in multivariate polynomial rings. Of particular interest to us is a class of schemes known
as “Polly Cracker.” We start by formalising and studying the relation between the ideal membership
problem and the problem of computing a Gro¨bner basis. We show both positive and negative results.
On the negative side, we define a symmetric Polly Cracker encryption scheme and prove that this
scheme only achieves bounded CPA security under the hardness of the ideal membership problem.
Furthermore, we show that a large class of algebraic transformations cannot convert this scheme to a
fully secure Polly Cracker-style scheme. On the positive side, we formalise noisy variants of the ideal-
theoretic problems. These problems can be seen as natural generalisations of the learning with errors
(LWE) and the approximate GCD problems over polynomial rings. After formalising and justifying
the hardness of the noisy assumptions, we show that noisy encoding of messages results in a fully
IND-CPA-secure and somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. Together with a standard symmetric-
to-asymmetric transformation for additively homomorphic schemes, we provide a positive answer to the
long-standing open problem of constructing a secure Polly Cracker-style cryptosystem reducible to the
hardness of solving a random system of equations. Indeed, our results go beyond this and also provide
a new family of somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes based on generalised hard problems. Our
results also imply that Regev’s LWE-based public-key encryption scheme is (somewhat) multiplicatively
homomorphic for appropriate choices of parameters.
Key words. [94A60] Cryptography, [93C35] Multivariable systems, [68Q17] Computational difficulty
of problems.
1 Introduction
Background. Fully homomorphic encryption [40] is a cryptographic primitive which allows per-
forming arbitrary computations over encrypted data. In such a scheme, given a function f and a
ciphertext c encrypting a plaintext m, it is possible to transform c into a new ciphertext c′ which
encrypts f(m). From an algebraic perspective, this homomorphic feature can be seen as the ability
to evaluate multivariate (Boolean) polynomials over ciphertexts. Hence, instantiating homomor-
phic encryption over the ring of multivariate polynomials is perhaps most natural, although not
necessarily conceptually the simplest (cf. [64]).
Indeed, let I be some ideal in P := F[x0, . . . , xn−1]. Denote an injective function mapping bit
strings to elements in the quotient ring P/I by Encode(·), and its inverse by Decode(·). If
Decode(Encode(m0) ◦ Encode(m1)) = m0 ◦ m1 for ◦ ∈ {+, ·}, we can encrypt a message m as
c = f + Encode(m), for f randomly chosen in I. (1)
The homomorphic features of this scheme follow from the definition of an ideal. Decryption is
performed by computing remainders modulo I. Alternative, if Encode(m) = 0 for some message
m, decryption is performed by deciding ideal membership. The problems of computing remainders
modulo an ideal and deciding ideal membership were solved by Buchberger [19,20,21], where he
introduced the notion of Gro¨bner bases, and gave an algorithm for computing such bases.
In fact, most known homomorphic schemes which support both addition and multiplication are
based on variants of the ideal membership problem over various rings. For example in [64] the
ring 〈p〉 ⊆ Z, for p an odd integer, is considered. In [40] ideals in a number field play the same
role (cf. [61]). One can also view Regev’s LWE-based public-key encryption scheme [56] as well
as the homomorphic encryption scheme based on it [18] in this framework. Furthermore, if we
instantiate the construction in [51] over P , we can view its multiplication operation as constructing
the set of cross-terms appearing in multivariate polynomial multiplication. Finally, we note that the
construction displayed above is essentially Polly Cracker [38,10,47], a family of cryptosystems dating
back to the early 1990s. Despite their simplicity, our confidence in Polly Cracker-style schemes has
been shaken as almost all such proposals have been broken [32]. This is partially due to the lack of
formal treatment of security for such schemes in the literature. In fact, it is a long-standing open
research problem to propose a secure Polly Cracker-style encryption scheme [10] (cf. [39, p. 41]).
Related works
Polly Cracker. In 1993, Barkee et al. wrote a paper [10] whose aim was to dispel the urban
legend that “Gro¨bner bases are hard to compute.” Another goal of this paper was to direct research
towards sparse systems of multivariate equations. To do so, the authors proposed the most obvious
dense Gro¨bner-based cryptosystem, namely an instantiation of the construction mentioned at the
beginning of the introduction. In their scheme, the public key consists of a set of polynomials
{f0, . . . , fm−1} ⊂ I which are used to construct an element f ∈ I. Encryption of messages m ∈ P/I
are computed as c =
∑
hifi + m = f + m for f ∈ I. The private key is a Gro¨bner basis G which
allows computing m = c mod I = c mod G. As highlighted in [10] this scheme can be broken using
results from [31] (cf. Section 5, Theorem 9).
At about the same time, and independently of Barkee et al., Fellows and Koblitz [38,47] proposed
a framework for the design of public-key cryptosystems. The ideas in [38] were similar to Barkee
et al.’s, but differed in two aspects. First, the polynomials generating the public ideal were derived
from combinatorial or algebraic NP-complete problems (such systems were named CA-systems for
“combinatorial-algebraic”). Second, the secret key was not a Gro¨bner basis of the public ideal, but
rather a root of it, i.e. a Gro¨bner basis of a maximal ideal containing the public ideal. The main
instantiation of such a system was the Polly Cracker cryptosystem. Fellows and Koblitz suggested
several NP-complete problems, mainly based on graph-theoretic problems, for use in this context.
The authors, however, did not investigate how one might generate “hard-on-average” instances of
these problems with known solutions.
Subsequently, a variety of sparse Polly Cracker-style schemes were proposed. The focus on sparse
polynomials aimed to prevent the attack based on Theorem 9 (Section 5), yet almost all of these
schemes were broken. We point the reader to [32] for a good survey of various constructions and
attacks. Currently, the only Polly Cracker-style scheme which is not broken is the scheme in [23].
This scheme is based on binomial ideals, which in turn are closely related to lattices.
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Not only can our constructions be seen as instantiations of Polly Cracker (with and without noisy
encoding of messages), they also allow security proofs based on the hardness of computational
problems related to random systems. Our work presents a general treatment of problems related to
ideals over multivariate polynomials – both with and without noise – and aims to provide a formal
basis to assess the security of cryptosystems based on such problems.
Homomorphic encryption. In the last decades several different approaches to construct singly
homomorphic schemes—with respect to both hardness assumptions and proofs of security—have
been investigated. With respect to doubly (i.e. additively and multiplicatively) homomorphic schemes,
a number of different hardness assumptions and constructions appeared in the literature. These
include the ideal coset problem of Gentry [40], the approximate GCD problem over the integers
(AGCD) of van Dijk et al. [64], the polynomial coset problem as proposed by Smart and Vercauteren
in [61], the approximate unique shortest vector problem, the subgroup decision problem, and the
differential knapsack vector problem all of which appear in the work of Aguilar Melchor et al. [51]
as well as the learning with errors problem (LWE) of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [18]. There
is a general agreement in the community that whilst the design of fully homomorphic encryption
schemes is a great theoretical breakthrough, all schemes so far have remained rather impractical.
However, research in this direction is progressing rapidly. Recently, Gentry and Halevi [42] have
been able to implement all aspects of Gentry’s scheme [40], including the bootstrapping step. In
this work the authors also improve on the work of Smart and Vercauteren [61]. Later, Gentry,
Halevi, and Smart implemented AES homomorphically [44]. However, the bootstrapping step still
renders somewhat homomorphic schemes impractical (cf. [54]). Hence, some recent constructions
aim to avoid it [17,41] and work is ongoing to improve this step [43].
Recently and independently of this work, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [18] gave an encryption
scheme, SH, based on the LWE problem that can be seen as a linear variant of our noisy Polly
Cracker scheme. Furthermore, the technique we propose in Section 8 was also independently pro-
posed in this work. However, in contrast to our work, the authors of [18] have an explicit non-
algebraic perspective. Also, a second scheme, BTS, was also proposed in [18], and it achieves full
homomorphicity based on a “dimension-modulus reduction” technique, while our work only yields
a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. We note that this technique also applies to our con-
structions. Finally, we note that improvements such as those proposed in [27] immediately apply
to our constructions (which generalise the constructions considered there).
The main difference between our work—which can be seen as an instantiation of Gentry’s ideal coset
problem—and previous work is that we base the security of our somewhat homomorphic scheme on
new computational problems related to ideals over multivariate polynomial rings which generalise
previously considered problems [18,64]. Furthermore, our construction in Section 7 can be seen as
a generalisation of a number of known schemes and their underlying hardness assumptions. As
such, our work does not improve on such constructions in terms of efficiency, but provides a unified
perspective on previous schemes and problems.
History of this Work. This work is based on two conference contributions. The first of which
being “Polly Cracker, revisited” which appeared at ASIACRYPT 2011 [2]. While this work contains
the bulk of theorems and lemmas also present in [2], there are some significant difference. Firstly,
[2] did not contain most proofs due to space restrictions. Furthermore, it defined two problem IR
and IRN which were dropped from this work, as they were found of little utility. However, most
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importantly, [2] contains several errors which were pointed out and partly corrected in [46] which
appeared at PKC 2012. In light of this, the authors of both publications [46] and [2] jointly revisited
all theorems, proofs and constructions which resulted in this paper.
Contributions & organisation
Our contributions in this paper can be summarised as follows:
1. We conduct a formal treatment of Polly Cracker-style schemes over multivariate polynomial
rings and characterise their security.
2. We demonstrate the impossibility of converting such schemes to fully IND-CPA-secure schemes
through a large class of transformations.
3. We introduce natural noisy variants of classical problems related to Gro¨bner bases which also
generalise previously considered noisy problems such as the LWE and the approximate GCD
(AGCD) problems.
4. We present a new somewhat (and doubly) homomorphic encryption scheme based on these new
hard problems.
In order of achieve these results, our work also provide some new results about the intractability
of multivariate problems with noise.
After this introduction, we start by giving an overview of Gro¨bner bases in Section 2. The reader
already familiar with commutative algebra can skip this part. In Section 3, we formalise various
problems associated with ideals in polynomials rings in the language of code-based security defini-
tions [14]. Namely, we define the Gro¨bner basis (GB) and the ideal membership (IM) problems in
the code-based game-playing language [14]. It not difficult to show, in the game-based formalism,
that IM is not harder than GB. We show also that deciding ideal membership with overwhelming
probability is equivalent to compute Gro¨bner bases for zero-dimensional ideals for certain choices
of parameters.
Lemma 1 (informal). If IM is overwhelmingly easy, then GB is overwhelmingly easy. Conversely,
if GB is easy then IM is easy as well.
This allows us to introduce a symmetric variant of Polly Cracker, that we shall call SPC, and
precisely characterise its security guarantees. In particular, we show that this scheme achieves a
weaker version of IND-CPA security where the total number of ciphertexts that the attacker can
obtain is a priori bounded by a fixed polynomial. We prove this result under the assumption that
computing Gro¨bner bases is hard if only a small number of polynomials are available to the attacker
(Section 4). Bounded IND-CPA security is, in some sense, the best level of security that this scheme
can possibly achieve: we give an attacker breaking the cryptosystem once enough ciphertexts are
collected.
Theorem 1 (simplified). The bounded IND-BCPA security of SPC is essentially equivalent to the
hardness of IM.
In Section 5, using results from computational commutative algebra, we show the security lim-
itations of the constructed scheme are, in some sense, intrinsic. More precisely, we show that a
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large class of algebraic transformation cannot turn this scheme into a fully IND-CPA-secure and
additively homomorphic (public-key) Polly Cracker-type scheme. Our result captures both known
symmetric-to-asymmetric conversion techniques for homomorphic schemes in the literature [58,64].
Furthermore, this result—due to the generality of Gro¨bner bases—implies that IND-CPA-secure ho-
momorphic encryption is difficult to construct without noisy encoding of messages (further evidence
for this is given in [16]). The main technical result of Section 5 is:
Theorem 2 (informal). Sampling uniformly elements of a polynomial ideal I up to some degree
is equivalent to computing a Gro¨bner basis for I.
In order to go beyond this barrier we consider constructions where the Encode() function in-
troduced in (1) is randomised. To prove security for such schemes, we consider noisy variants of
the ideal membership (IMN) and related problems (namely, WIMN a weaker version of ideal ideal
membership with noise, and GBN a noisy variant of GB). These can be seen as natural generali-
sations of the (decisional) LWE and AGCD problems over polynomial rings (Section 6). Regarding
the hardness of these new problems, we show that:
Lemma 2 (informal). If GBN easy, then it holds that WIMN is easy.
Note that WIMN is not harder that IMN, whilst the converse is not always true. However, we show
that the equivalence holds in a relevant case. We also prove an average-case-to-worst-case reduction
for IMN.
Lemma 3. (informal) Assume that the ideal considered in the IMN games have a unique solution.
Then, if we can solve the IMN problem for a polynomial fraction of instances, then we can also
solve it for all instances.
After formalising and justifying the hardness of the noisy assumptions in Section 7, we show that
noisy encoding of messages can indeed be used to construct a fully IND-CPA-secure somewhat
homomorphic scheme.
Theorem 3 (informal). The IND-CPA security of SPCN scheme is essentially equivalent to the
hardness of WIMN.
Our result, together with a standard symmetric-to-asymmetric conversion for homomorphic schemes,
provides a positive answer to the long-standing open problem proposed by Barkee et al. [10] asking
for a Polly Cracker-style public-key encryption scheme whose security is based on the hardness of
computing Gro¨bner bases for random systems of polynomials. This result also implies that Regev’s
LWE-based public-key scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic under appropriate choices of param-
eters.
In Section 8 we show that our scheme allows proxy re-encryption of ciphertexts. This re-encryption
procedure can be seen as trading noise for degree in ciphertexts. In this section, we also show that
our scheme achieves a limited form of key-dependent message (KDM) security in the standard
model, where the least significant bit of the constant term of the key is encrypted. We leave it as
an open problem to adapt the techniques of [3] to achieve full KDM security for the Polly Cracker
with noise scheme. We conclude by discussing concrete parameter choices in Section 9, and give a
reference implementation in Section 10.
5
2 Basics of Gro¨bner Bases
In this section we recall some basic definitions and results related to Gro¨bner bases [21,19,20].
For a more detailed treatment we refer the reader to [29]. We consider a polynomial ring P =
F[x0, . . . , xn−1] over some finite field (typically prime), some degree-compatible monomial ordering
on the elements of P with xi > xj if i < j, and a set of polynomials f0, . . . , fm−1. We denote by M(f)
the set of all monomials appearing in f ∈ P and extend this definition to sets of polynomials in the
natural way. By LM(f) we denote the leading monomial appearing in f ∈ P according to the chosen
term ordering. We denote by LC(f) the coefficient of LM(f) in f , and set LT(f) := LC(f)·LM(f).
We denote by P<d the set of polynomials of degree < d (and analogously for >,≤,≥, and =
operations). We define P=0 as the underlying field, including 0 ∈ F. We define P<0 as zero. Finally,
we denote by M<m the set of all monomials < m for some monomial m (and analogously for
>,≤,≥, and = operations). We assume the usual power-product representation for elements of P .
Definition 1 (Generated ideal). Let f0, . . . , fm−1 ∈ P be polynomials. The set
I = 〈f0, . . . , fm−1〉 :=
{
m−1∑
i=0
hifi | h0, . . . , hm−1 ∈ P
}
is called the ideal generated by f0, . . . , fm−1.
It is known that every ideal I of P is finitely generated, i.e. there exists a finite number of poly-
nomials f0, . . . , fm−1 in P such that I = 〈f0, . . . , fm−1〉. A Gro¨bner basis of an ideal is a set of
generators of the ideal which takes a particular form.
Definition 2 (Gro¨bner basis). Let I be an ideal of F[x0, . . . , xn−1] and fix a monomial ordering.
A finite subset G = {g0, . . . , gm−1} ⊂ I is said to be a Gro¨bner basis of I if for any f ∈ I there
exists a gi ∈ G such that LM(gi) | LM(f).
Remark. We note that for the vector space Fn, the notion of a Gro¨bner basis coincides with that
of a row echelon form, and Gro¨bner basis algorithms (see below) reduce to Gaussian elimination.
For univariate polynomial rings, e.g. F[x] and Z[x], the notion of a Gro¨bner basis coincides with
greatest common divisor, and running a Gro¨bner basis algorithm computes the GCD.
It is possible to extend the polynomial division algorithm to multivariate polynomials: we write
r = f mod G when r is a possible result of applying the multivariate division algorithm on f and
G for the given monomial ordering. It holds that f =
∑m−1
i=0 hi gi + r with M(r) ∩ 〈LM(G)〉 = ∅.
When G is a Gro¨bner basis, r is unique and is called the normal form of f with respect to the ideal
I. In particular, we have that f mod I = f mod G = 0 if and only if f ∈ I. Given P and I, we
can define the quotient ring P/I. By abuse of notation, we write f ∈ P/I if f mod I = f where
the last equality is interpreted over the elements of P . That is, we identify elements of the quotient
P/I with their minimal representation in P .
As defined above, a Gro¨bner basis is not unique. For instance, we can multiply any polynomial
of a Gro¨bner basis by a nonzero constant. However, given any Gro¨bner basis we can compute the
unique reduced Gro¨bner basis in polynomial time via ReduceGB(·) given in Algorithm 1.
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Definition 3 (Reduced Gro¨bner basis). A reduced Gro¨bner basis for an ideal I ⊂ P is a
Gro¨bner basis G such that: (1) LC(g) = 1, for all g ∈ G, and (2) ∀g ∈ G, 6 ∃ m ∈ M(g) such that
m is divisible by some element of LM(G \ {g}).
Algorithm 1: ReduceGB(G)
1 begin
2 G˜← ∅;
3 while G 6= ∅ do
4 f ← the smallest element of G according to the term ordering;
5 G← G \ {f};
6 if LM(f) 6∈ 〈LM(G˜)〉 then
7 G˜← G˜ ∪ {LC(f)−1 · f};
8 return
[
h mod G˜\{h} | h ∈ G˜
]
;
Buchberger [19] proved that in order to compute a Gro¨bner basis from a given ideal basis, it is
sufficient to consider so-called S-polynomials. From such a basis, it is easy to compute the (unique)
reduced Gro¨bner basis using Algorithm 1.
Definition 4 (S-polynomial). Let f, g ∈ F[x0, . . . , xn−1] be nonzero polynomials.
– Let LM(f) =
∏n−1
i=0 x
αi
i and LM(g) =
∏n−1
i=0 x
βi
i , with αi, βi ∈ N, denote the leading monomials
of f and g respectively. For every 0 ≤ i < n set γi := max(αi, βi) and denote by xγ the
polynomial
∏n−1
i=0 x
γi
i . Then x
γ is the least common multiple of LM(f) and LM(g):
xγ = LCM(LM(f),LM(g)).
– The S-polynomial of f and g is defined as
S(f, g) =
xγ
LT(f)
· f − x
γ
LT(g)
· g.
Buchberger showed that a basis is a Gro¨bner basis if all S-polynomials “reduce to zero.”
Definition 5 (Reduction to zero). Fix a monomial order in P and let G = {g0, . . . , gs−1} ⊂ P
be an unordered set of polynomials and let t be a monomial. Given a polynomial f ∈ P , we say f
has a t-representation with respect to ≤ and G if f can be written as
f = a0g0 + · · ·+ as−1gs−1,
such that whenever aigi 6= 0, we have aigi ≤ t. Furthermore, we write that f −→
G
0 (“f reduces to
zero”) if and only if f has an LM(f)-representation with respect to G.
Note that f mod G = 0 implies that f −→
G
0 while the converse is not necessarily the case.
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Theorem 4 (Buchberger’s criterion). A basis G = {g0, . . . , gs−1} for an ideal I is a Gro¨bner
basis if and only if for all i 6= j we have S(gi, gj) −→
G
0.
Theorem 4 (see [12, p.211f] for a proof) leads to an algorithm [19] which computes a Gro¨bner basis
by constructing and reducing S-polynomials. However, this algorithm – Buchberger’s algorithm –
spends most of its time reducing elements to zero, a computation which is of no use. Buchberger also
proposed two criteria which tell us a priori whether the S-polynomial of two polynomials reduces
to zero. We make use of the first criterion in this work (see [12, p.222f] for a proof of this result):
Theorem 5 (Buchberger’s first criterion). Let f, g ∈ P be such that
LCM(LM(f),LM(g)) = LM(f) · LM(g),
i.e. f and g have disjoint leading terms. Then S(f, g) −→
{f,g}
0.
From this, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A set {g0, . . . , gn−1} ⊂ P with LM(gi) = xdii with di ≥ 0 for all i, 0 ≤ i < n is a
Gro¨bner basis.
All ideals considered in this work are zero-dimensional, i.e. their associated varieties have finitely
many points. The following lemma establishes the equivalence between various statements about
zero-dimensional ideals. This result will be required to analyse some algorithms introduced in
Section 3 (a proof of this result can be found, for instance, in [29, p.234f]).
Lemma 4 (Finiteness criterion). Let I = 〈f0, . . . , fm−1〉 ⊂ P := F[x0, . . . , xn−1] be an ideal.
The following conditions are equivalent.
1. The system has only finitely many solutions in the algebraic closure of F.
2. For any i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, we have I ∩ F[xi] 6= ∅.
3. For any i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, there exists gi ∈ I such that LM(gi) = xdii with di > 0.
4. The set of monomials S(I) := M(P ) \ {LM(f) | f ∈ I} is finite.
5. The F-vector space P/I is finite-dimensional and a basis is given by S(I).
As soon as one of these conditions holds true, then we call the ideal I zero-dimensional. Moreover,
the number of solutions counted with multiplicities in the algebraic closure of F is exactly the cardinal
of S(I) which is the dimension of the vector space P/I.
We will be using reduction modulo an ideal to sample polynomials from some ideal. The following
lemma will be helpful to assert that this sampling is uniform.
Lemma 5. Let I ⊂ P be an ideal with a degree-compatible term ordering ≤. Then any f ∈ P with
deg(f) = b has a unique representation f = f˜ + r with f˜ ∈ I and r ∈ P/I where deg(f˜) ≤ b and
deg(r) ≤ b. In particular, if M(P≤b/I) is the set of monomials in P/I with degree at most b, then
for any f˜ ∈ I≤b there are qs elements fi in P≤b with f˜ = fi − (fi mod I) and s = |M(P≤b/I)|.
8
Proof. Given f we recover the unique r by computing f mod G by a standard fact about Gro¨bner
bases and get f˜ = f − r. Since P has a degree-compatible ordering, r has degree at most b. To
prove the second claim, note that the monomials in P≤b span an
(
n+b
b
)
-dimensional vector space
V over Fq. The monomials in P/I up to degree b span a subspace of V of dimension |M(P≤b/I)|,
from which the claim follows. uunionsq
3 The Gro¨bner Basis and Ideal Membership Problems
In this section we formalise various problems associated with Gro¨bner bases.
Notation. We write x ← y for assigning value y to a variable x, and x←$ X for sampling x from
a set X uniformly at random. If A is a probabilistic algorithm we write y←$ A(x1, . . . , xn) for the
action of running A on inputs x1, . . . , xn with uniformly chosen random coins, and assigning the
result to y. For a random variable X we denote by [X] the support of X, i.e. the set of all values that
X takes with nonzero probability. We use PPT for probabilistic polynomial-time. We call a function
(λ) negligible if |(λ)| ∈ λ−ω(1). We say a function f(λ) is overwhelming if 1−f(λ) is negligible. We
say that a function space FunSp(P) and a message space MsgSp(P), both parameterised by P, are
compatible if for any possible value of P and for any f ∈ FunSp(P), the domain of f is MsgSp(P).
We also denote by ω the matrix multiplication exponent (a.k.a. the linear-algebra constant) as
defined in [65, Chapter 12]. We recall [66,63] that ω ∈ [2, 2.3727].
To formalise our problems, we use the code-based game-playing language [14]. Each game has an
Initialize and a Finalize procedure. It also has specifications of procedures to respond adversary’s
various oracle queries. A game Game is run with an adversary A as follows. First Initialize runs
and its outputs are passed to A. Then A runs and its oracle queries are answered by the procedures
of Game. When A terminates, its output is passed to Finalize which returns the outcome of the
game y. This interaction is written as GameA =⇒ y. In each game, we restrict our attention to
legitimate adversaries, which are defined specifically for each game.
Following [30], we define a computational polynomial ring scheme. This is a general framework
allowing to discuss in a concrete way the different families of rings that may be used in cryptographic
applications. More formally, a computational polynomial ring scheme P is a sequence of probability
distribution of polynomial ring descriptions (Pλ)λ∈N. A polynomial ring description1 P specifies
various algorithms associated with P such as computing the ring operations, sampling of elements,
testing membership, encoding of elements, ordering of monomials, etc. We assume each polynomial
ring distribution is over n = n(λ) variables, for some polynomial n(λ), and is over a finite field of
prime size q(λ).
For q a prime, there is a one-to-one correspondence between ideals I ⊂ Fqn [x0, . . . , xn−1] on poly-
nomial rings over finite extension fields and over prime fields J ⊂ Fq[x0, . . . , xn−1, α]: map a root of
Fqn to α and add the characteristic polynomial of Fqn to the generating basis. Hence, finite exten-
sion fields are covered by this definition. The ring Z[x0, . . . , xn−1] is not covered by our definition
for brevity, but it can easily be generalised [12, Ch. 10].
Once P is given and a concrete ring P is sampled, one can define various Gro¨bner basis generation
algorithms on P . In this work we denote by GBGen(1λ, P, d, `) any PPT algorithm which outputs
1 Here we are slightly abusing notation and using P both for the polynomial ring and its description.
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a reduced Gro¨bner basis G for some zero-dimensional ideal I ⊂ P such that the last ` elements of
G have degree d and the remaining elements have degree 1 and such that (P \ I)≤b is not empty.
Of particular interest to us is the Gro¨bner basis generation algorithm shown in Algorithm 2 called
GBGendense(·). Throughout this paper we assume an implicit dependency of various parameters
associated with P on the security parameter. Thus, we drop λ to ease notation. Finally, we always
assume that LM(G) and hence S(I) is fixed by GBGen(·) for each λ, and thus is known. We
Algorithm 2: Algorithm GBGendense(1
λ, P, d, `)
1 begin
2 if d = 0 then return {0};
3 for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} do
4 if i > n− `− 1 then
5 gi ← xdi ;
6 else
7 gi ← xi;
8 for mj ∈M<LM(gi) do
9 cij ←$ Fq;
10 gi ← gi + cijmj ;
11 return ReduceGB({g0, . . . , gn−1});
note that using Buchberger’s First Criterion in Algorithm 2 is a special case of using Macaulay’s
trick [53]. Also, GBGendense(·) for d = 1 or any d > 1 with ` = 0 captures the usual case of a set
of polynomials which have a (unique) common root in the base field, and where LM(gi) = xi for
all i, 0 ≤ i < n. This case is common in cryptographic applications such as algebraic cryptanalysis,
e.g. [36,28,60] and is well studied. The next lemma – which is an easy consequence of Corollary 1
– establishes that GBGendense(·) returns a Gro¨bner basis with dim(P/I) = d`.
Lemma 6. Let G = {g0, . . . , gn−1} ⊂ P = F[x0, . . . , xn−1] be the set of polynomials defined as
gi := x
di
i +
∑
mj∈M
<x
di
i
cijmj , ∀i, 0 ≤ i < n
where cij ∈ F. Then G is a Gro¨bner basis for the zero-dimensional ideal 〈g0, . . . , gn−1〉. Additionally,
the dimension of the Fq-vector space P/〈g0, . . . , gn−1〉 is
∏n−1
i=0 di.
Proof. The Gro¨bner basis property follows from Corollary 1. Clearly, S(I) = M(P ) \ {LM(f) | f ∈
I} is the set of all monomials of the form ∏n−1j=0 xγjj where all γj < dj . Since there are ∏n−1i=0 di such
elements, this is also the dimension of the vector space by Lemma 4. uunionsq
Denote Q = P≤b/I for b some fixed parameter and note here that P≤b/I = (P/I)≤b, since the
monomial order sorts by total degree first. In this work we are mainly interested in the case where
Q has polynomially many elements. In this case we require ` to be a constant but allow q to depend
on λ. We note, however, that larger quotients are permitted by our definitions.
We now formally define the Gro¨bner basis problem, which is the problem of computing the Gro¨bner
basis for some ideal I given a set of polynomials f0, . . . , fm−1 ∈ I.
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Definition 6 (The Gro¨bner basis (GB) problem). The Gro¨bner basis problem is defined
through game GBP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m shown in Figure 1. The advantage of a PPT algorithm A in
solving the GB problem is defined by
AdvgbP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ) := Pr
[
GBAP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m(λ)⇒ True
]
.
An adversary is legitimate if it calls the Sample procedure of Figure 1 at most m = m(λ) times.
Initialize(1λ,P, d, `):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
return (1λ, P );
end
Sample():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
f ← f − (f mod G);
return f ;
end
Finalize(G′):
begin
return (G = G′);
end
Fig. 1. Game GBP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m.
It follows from Lemma 5 that the Sample procedure in Figure 1 returns elements of degree ≤ b
which are uniformly distributed in 〈G〉≤b. We note that usually we must require b ≥ d in order
to exclude the trivial case where Sample always returns zero or elements independent of some
elements of the Gro¨bner basis.
We recall that given a Gro¨bner basis G of an ideal I, r = f mod I = f mod G is the normal
form of f with respect to the ideal I. We sometimes drop the explicit reference to I when it is
clear from the context which ideal we are referring to, and simply refer to r as the normal form
of f . Furthermore f ∈ I if and only if r = 0. This is the well-known ideal membership problem
formalised below. We mention that solving this problem was the original motivation which led to
the discovery of Gro¨bner bases [19].
Definition 7 (The ideal membership (IM) problem). The ideal membership problem is defined
through game IMP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m shown in Figure 2. The advantage of a PPT algorithm A in solving
IM is defined by
AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
IMAP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m(λ)⇒ True
]
− 1.
An adversary is legitimate if it calls the Sample procedure of Figure 2 at most m = m(λ) times.
Initialize(1λ,P, d, `):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
c←$ {0, 1};
Q← (P/〈G〉)≤b;
return (1λ, P );
end
Sample():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
f ′ ← f mod G;
return f − f ′;
end
Challenge():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
f ← f − (f mod G);
if c = 0 then
r ←$ Q \ {0};
f ← f + r;
return f ;
end
Finalize(c′):
begin
return (c = c′);
end
Fig. 2. Game IMP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m.
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We note that in the above definition we have excluded the zero element in the sampling of the
remainder when coin c takes value 0. This is to ensure than an algorithm can have an overwhelming
advantage in solving the IM problem.
We define a game IM′P,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m similarly to the game in Figure 2 except that the zero element
is allowed when c = 0 in the Challenge procedure (i.e., r ←$ Q \ {0} is replaced by r ←$ Q). The
advantage of any adversary A in a modified IM′ game can be easily related to that in the IM game.
Lemma 7. It holds that Advim
′
P,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ) =
(
1− 1|Q|
)
·AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ), for any
adversary A.
Proof. Let p be the probability that A outputs 0 when the remainder of the challenge polynomial
modulo G is zero. Let p′ denote the probability that A outputs 1 when this remainder is nonzero.
We have:
2 · Pr[A wins the IM game]− 1 = p+ p′ − 1,
2 · Pr[A wins the IM′ game]− 1 = p+ 1|Q|(1− p) +
(
1− 1|Q|
)
p′ − 1
=
(
1− 1|Q|
)
· (p+ p′ − 1).
uunionsq
We show below that under certain conditions the GB and IM problems are equivalent. Informally,
the reduction of the GB problem to the IM problem works as follows. Consider an arbitrary element
gi in the Gro¨bner basis G. We can write gi as x
di
i − g˜i for some g˜i < gi. Now, assume xdii −ri is in the
ideal and that ri < x
di
i , i.e. LM(x
di
i −ri) = xdii and xdii −ri ∈ 〈G〉. To find such an ri we exhaustively
search Q and hence require |Q| = poly(λ). Repeat this process for all xdii and accumulate the results
xdii − ri in a list G˜. The list G˜ is a list of elements in 〈G〉 with LM(G˜) = LM(G) which implies that
G˜ is a Gro¨bner basis. We note that this is the core idea behind the FGLM algorithm [35] which
allows to efficiently change the ordering of a Gro¨bner basis given access to an oracle computing
normal forms with probability 1 (and also “Bulygin’s attack” in a different context [22]).
Lemma 8. (IM overwhelmingly easy =⇒ GB overwhelmingly easy) Suppose the quotient
size |Q| is polynomial in λ. Then for any PPT adversary A against the IM problem, there exists a
PPT adversary B against the GB problem such that
1− poly(λ) · (1−AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ)) ≤ AdvgbP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m+1,B(λ),
where poly(λ) := |LM(G)| · (|Q| − 1).
(GB easy =⇒ IM easy) Conversely, for any PPT adversary A against the GB problem, there
exists a PPT adversary B against the IM problem such that
AdvgbP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ) ≤ AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,B(λ).
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Proof. Let us write P im-0A (resp., P
im-1
A ) for the success probability of any algorithm A against the
IM problem conditioned on the event c = 0 (uniform challenge) (resp., c = 1). Various parameters
are implicitly understood from the context. By the definition of advantage, we have
AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A = P
im-0
A + P
im-1
A − 1.
Now, to prove the first statement, we construct an algorithm B against the GB problem based on
an algorithm A against the IM problem. This algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: GB adversary B from IM adversary A
1 begin
2 B receives (1λ, P );
3 G˜← ∅;
4 query GB.Sample() to get f0, . . . , fm−1;
5 query GB.Sample() to get f ;
6 for m ∈ LM(G) do
7 for b ∈ P/I do
8 run A(1λ, P ) as follows:
9 if A queries IM.Sample() then
10 answer A’s ith query with fi; // we reuse fi between different runs of A.
11 if A queries IM.Challenge() then
12 g˜i = m− b;
13 return f + g˜i;
14 if A calls IM.Finalize(c′) then
15 if c′ = 1 then // g˜i likely in I
16 G˜← G˜ ∪ {g˜i};
17 break;
18 call GB.Finalize(G˜);
We lower-bound the probability that algorithm B returns the correct Gro¨bner basis based on the
success probability of A. Note that if all of A’s answers are correct, then B’s output will be the
Gro¨bner basis. Applying the union bound, we derive an upper bound on the failure probability of
B by bounding the failure probability of A in each invocation. Let ε = P im-0A + P im-1A − 1 be A’s
advantage. Now consider invocations of A with g˜i = m−b ∈ I within B. Then on such a query, A is
run in an environment with the challenge bit being 1. By definition, the probability of A’s failure in
this case is 1−P im-1A . Now consider invocations with g˜i 6∈ I. Since we iterate over all remainders, the
average (over the choice of b, such that g˜i 6∈ I) failure probability for such invocations is 1−P im-0A .
The union bound leads to an upper bound of
|LM(G)|(1− P im-1A ) + |LM(G)|(|Q| − 1)(1− P im-0A )
on the failure probability of B, which in turn can be upper bounded by
|LM(G)|(|Q| − 1)(2− P im-1A − P im-0A ) = |LM(G)|(|Q| − 1)(1− ε),
as desired.
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Finally, it is easy to see that Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time. The outer loop is repeated
|LM(G)| and the inner loop |P/I| both of which are poly(λ). Algorithm B makes one additional
query to Sample compared to A and hence needs m+ 1 samples.
Algorithm 4: IM adversary B from GB adversary A
1 begin
2 B receives (1λ, P );
3 Query IM.Challenge() to get h;
4 Run A(1λ, P ) as follows:
5 if A queries GB.Sample() then
6 query IM.Sample() to get f ;
7 return f ;
8 if A calls GB.Finalize(G′) then
9 if G′ is a red. Gro¨bner basis with the correct leading monomials then
10 r ← h mod G′;
11 call IM.Finalize
(
1− (r = 0));
12 else
13 c′ ←$ {0, 1};
14 call IM.Finalize(c′);
For the second statement, we construct B as in Algorithm 4. We use A to find a candidate Gro¨bner
basis G′. If G′ = G we can compute the remainder r modulo the ideal spanned by the basis in
polynomial time (cf. [29, p. 82]) and check if r = 0. So B will be successful whenever A is. By
definition, the advantage of B is given by
AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,B(λ) = 2 · Pr [B successful]− 1
= 2
(
Pr [B successful | A successful]− 12
) · Pr [A successful]
+ 2
(
Pr [B successful | A not successful]− 12
) · Pr [A not successful] .
The first summand is exactly what we need, so to finish the proof we need to show that the second
summand is non-negative. This means, it remains to show that if G′ 6= G, then B still has a non-
negative advantage, i.e. B guesses c with probability at least 1/2. Indeed, if G′ does not have the
correct form, B simply guesses the bit c (leading to a zero advantage). Moreover, if G′ has the right
form, reduction modulo G′ gives rise to an Fq-linear map mG′ : P≤b −→ Q, f 7→ f mod G′. Since
surjective linear maps preserve uniform distributions on finite-dimensional vector spaces, it follows
that
Pr
f ←$ P≤b
[mG′(f) = 0] =
1
|mG′(P≤b)| and Prf ←$ I≤b [mG
′(f) = 0] =
1
|mG′(I≤b)| .
Since I≤b ⊆ P≤b, we get
Pr
f ←$ P≤b
[mG′(f) = 0] ≤ Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[mG′(f) = 0] .
Now, let
p0 := Pr
f ←$ P≤b
[f ∈ I≤b] and p1 := Pr
f ←$ P≤b
[f ∈ P≤b \ I≤b] ,
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where p1 6= 0 since the quotient has positive dimension. Finally, let A be the event “mG′(f) = 0.”
Then, since
Pr
f ←$ P≤b
[A] = p0 · Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A] + p1 · Pr
f ←$ P≤b\I≤b
[A] ,
we get
p0 · Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A] + p1 · Pr
f ←$ P≤b\I≤b
[A] ≤ Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A]
⇐⇒ p1 · Pr
f ←$ P≤b\I≤b
[A] ≤ (1− p0) · Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A]
⇐⇒ p1 · Pr
f ←$ P≤b\I≤b
[A] ≤ p1 · Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A]
⇐⇒ Pr
f ←$ P≤b\I≤b
[A] ≤ Pr
f ←$ I≤b
[A] .
uunionsq
Remark. Lemma 8 only proves a weak form of the equivalence between IM and GB. That is,
for Lemma 8 to be meaningful we require that the IM adversary returns the correct answer with
overwhelming probability. First, this is due to the restriction that Sample can only be called a
bounded number of times, and thus we cannot amplify the success probability of the IM adversary
through repetition. We note that it is possible to prove a stronger statement than Lemma 8 for
d = 1 using the re-randomisation technique from [15]. Second, Lemma 8 does not address “structural
errors” when d > 1, e.g. an IM oracle which decides based on partial information only. For example,
assume G = [x0+s0xn−1, x1+s1xn−1, . . . , x2n−1+sn−1xn−1] where si ←$ Fq. This is a valid Gro¨bner
basis generated by an algorithm satisfying the requirements for GBGen(·). We have that S(I) =
{xn−1, 1} and by construction any f ∈ P with a nonzero constant coefficient is not an element
of I = 〈G〉. Hence, it is easy – although not overwhelmingly so – to solve the IM problem by
considering the constant coefficient only. On the other hand, the GB problem is still assumed to be
hard, as it requires to recover all si.
3.1 Hardness assumptions
It is well known [11] that the worst-case complexity of the best algorithms of Gro¨bner bases com-
putation is doubly exponential in the number of variables. However, in this work we are concerned
with polynomial systems over finite fields, which do not achieve this worst-case complexity. In par-
ticular, we consider zero-dimensional ideals, i.e. ideals with a finite number of common roots. In
order to make the paper self-content, we recall here a number of classical complexity results for
these type of systems.
Lazard [48] showed that computing the Gro¨bner basis for a system of polynomials is equivalent
to performing Gaussian elimination on so-called Macaulay matrices Macaulayd,m for d, 1 ≤ d ≤ D for
some D.
Definition 8 (Macaulay matrix). For a set of m polynomials f0, . . . , fm−1 ∈ P , we define the
Macaulay matrix Macaulayd,m of degree d as follows. Each column corresponds to one monomial. List
“horizontally” all the degree ≤ d monomials from largest to smallest sorted by some fixed monomial
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ordering. The smallest monomial comes last. Multiply each fi by all monomials ti,j of degree d− di
where di = deg(fi). Finally, construct the coefficient matrix for the resulting system:
Macaulayd,m :=
monomials of degree ≤ d
(t0,0, f0)
(t0,1, f0)
(t0,2, f0)
...
(t1,0, f1)
...
(tm−1,0, fm−1)
(tm−1,1, fm−1)
...


.
Theorem 6. Let F = {f0, . . . , fm−1} be a set of polynomials in P . There exists a positive integer
D for which Gaussian elimination on all Macaulayd,m matrices for d = 1, . . . , D computes a Gro¨bner
basis of 〈F 〉.
The F4 algorithm [33] can be seen as another way to use linear algebra without knowing an a priori
bound: it successively constructs and reduces matrices until a Gro¨bner basis is found. The same
is true for the F5 algorithm when considered in “F4-style” [5,1]. Consequently, the complexity is
bounded by the degree D and the number of polynomials considered at each degree. For F5 [34] and
the matrix-F5 variant [37] we know that under some regularity assumptions all matrices have full
rank which implies that the number of rows in the matrix is bounded by the number of columns.
The number of monomials up to some degree d is bounded by
(
n+d
n
)
and thus when considering
some degree d the number of rows and columns of the matrices considered by F5 is also bounded
above by
(
n+d
d
)
. Thus, knowing the degree up to which F5 has to compute provides an upper bound
on the complexity of Gro¨bner bases. For this, the following definition [8] is useful.
Definition 9 (Semi-regular sequence of degree D). Let f0, . . . , fm−1 be homogeneous polyno-
mials in P whose degrees are d0, . . . , dm−1 respectively. We call this system a semi-regular sequence
of degree D if:
1. 〈f0, . . . , fm−1〉 6= F[x0, . . . , xn−1].
2. For all 0 ≤ i < m and g ∈ F[x0, . . . , xn−1],
(deg(g · fi) < D and g · fi ∈ 〈f0, . . . , fi−1〉) =⇒ g ∈ 〈f0, . . . , fi−1〉.
We call D the degree of semi-regularity of the system.
Definition 10 (Semi-regular sequence [8]). Let m > n, and f0, . . . , fm−1 be homogeneous
polynomials of degree b in P generating an ideal I. The system is said to be a semi-regular sequence
if the Hilbert series [12] of I with respect to the degree reverse lexicographical order is
HI(z) =
∑
k≥0
ckz
k =
(1− zb)m
(1− z)n .
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Hence, for semi-regular sequences the degree of semi-regularity of the system is given by the index
of the first non-positive coefficient of HI(z).
This notion can be extended to affine polynomials by considering their homogeneous components
of highest degree. It is conjectured that random systems are semi-regular with overwhelming prob-
ability. For semi-regular sequences, we have the following complexity result for F5 [8,9,7].
Theorem 7. Let F = {f0, . . . , fm−1} be a set of polynomials in P . Assuming that F is a semi-
regular sequence, the complexity of the currently best known algorithm (i.e. F5) to solve the Gro¨bner
basis problem is given by
O
((
n+D
D
)ω)
where 2 ≤ ω < 3 is the linear algebra constant, and D is the degree of semi-regularity of the system.
Asymptotic bounds for the degree of semi-regularity for semi-regular sequences of degree 2 can be
found in [8]. These bounds for the degree of regularity lead to the following complexity estimates
for Gro¨bner basis computations.
Corollary 2. Let c ≥ 0. Then for m(λ) = c · n(λ) (resp., m(λ) = c · n(λ)2) quadratic polynomials
in some ideal I ⊂ Fq[x0, . . . , xn−1], the Gro¨bner basis of I can be computed in exponential (resp.,
polynomial) time in n(λ).
Lemma 8 states that the IM problem is equivalent to the GB problem if we have access to an IM
oracle which succeeds with overwhelming probability. Although we cannot show this equivalence in
general, we may assume that the two problems are indeed equivalent when d = 1 (cf. [15]):
Definition 11 (The GB and IM assumptions). Let P be such that n(λ) = Ω(λ). Assume b > 1,
d = 1, and that m(λ) = c · n(λ) for a constant c ≥ 1. Then the advantage of any PPT algorithm
in solving the GB or the IM problem is negligible as function of λ.
4 Symmetric Polly Cracker: The Noise-Free Version
4.1 Homomorphic symmetric encryption
Syntax. An arity-t homomorphic symmetric encryption scheme is specified by four PPT algo-
rithms as follows.
1. Gen(1λ). This is the key-generation algorithm, and is run by the receiver. On input a security
parameter, it outputs a (secret) key SK and an (evaluation) public key PK. This algorithm also
outputs the descriptions of a pair of compatible spaces FunSp and MsgSp.
2. Enc(m,SK). This is the encryption algorithm, and is run by the sender. On input a message m,
and a key SK, it returns a ciphertext c.
3. Eval(c0, . . . , ct−1, C,PK). This is the evaluation algorithm, and is run by an evaluator. On input
t ciphertexts c0, . . . , ct−1, a circuit C, and the public key, it outputs a ciphertext cevl.
17
4. Dec(cevl, SK). This is the deterministic decryption algorithm, and is run by the receiver. On
input an (evaluated) ciphertext cevl, a key SK, it returns either a message m or a special failure
symbol ⊥.
Correctness. A homomorphic symmetric encryption scheme is correct if for any polynomial
p, any λ ∈ N, any (SK,PK) ∈ [Gen(1λ)], any t = p(λ) messages mi ∈ MsgSp(PK), any circuit
C ∈ FunSp(PK) of arity t, any t ciphertexts ci ∈ [Enc(mi, SK)], and any evaluated ciphertext
cevl ∈ [Eval(c0, . . . , ct−1, C,PK)], we have that Dec(cevl, SK) = C(m0, . . . ,mt−1). Depending on the
context, the correctness condition might also be imposed over freshly created ciphertexts.
Compactness. A homomorphic encryption scheme is compact if there exists a fixed polynomial
bound B(·) so that for any (SK,PK) ∈ [Gen(1λ)], any circuit C ∈ FunSp(PK), any t messages
mi ∈ MsgSp(PK), any ci ∈ [Enc(mi,SK)], and any cevl ∈ [Eval(c0, . . . , ct−1, C,PK)], the size of cevl is
at most B(λ+ |C(m0, . . . ,mt−1)|) (independently of the size of C).
The syntax of a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme is defined similarly, with the exception
that the encryption algorithm takes the public key rather than the secret key as an input.
4.2 Description of the scheme
In this section we formally define the (noise-free) symmetric Polly Cracker encryption scheme. We
present a family of schemes parametrised not only by the underlying computational polynomial ring
scheme P, but also by a Gro¨bner basis generation algorithm, which itself depends on a degree bound
d, and a second degree bound b. However, to satisfy our security assumption (cf. Definition 11) we
require d = 1. Our parameterised scheme, which we write as SPCP,GBGen(·),d,`,b, is presented in
Figure 3. The message space is Q = P≤b/I. As a vector space, Q is determined by the leading
terms LM(G) alone and hence independent of the randomness of GBGen(·). However, as a ring, Q
is only independent of the randomness of GBGen(·) if d = 1; in that case Q = Fq. Here, Q as a ring
being independent of the randomness of GBGen(·) means that we can perform ring operations in
Q such that the result, represented as an element of Q ⊂ P , can be computed without knowledge
of G. For d > 1 this is not the case for multiplication.
GenP,GBGen(·),d,`,b(1λ):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
SK← (G,P, b);
PK← (P, b);
return (SK,PK);
end
Enc(m, SK):
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
f ′ ← f mod G;
f ← f − f ′;
c← m + f ;
return c;
end
Dec(c, SK):
begin
m← c mod G;
return m;
end
Eval(c0, . . . , ct−1, C,PK):
begin
apply the Add and Mult
gates of C over P ;
return the result;
end
Fig. 3. The (noise-free) Symmetric Polly Cracker scheme SPCP,GBGen(·),d,`,b.
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Correctness of evaluation. Let d = 1 and consider the two ciphertexts c0 =
∑
h0,jgj + m0
and c1 =
∑
h1,jgj + m1. Addition and multiplication of the two ciphertexts c0, c1 are given by
c0 + c1 =
∑
h0,jgj + m0 +
∑
h1,jgj + m1
=
∑
(h0,j + h1,j)gj + m0 + m1,
c0 · c1 = (
∑
h0,jgj + m0) · (
∑
h1,jgj + m1)
= (
∑
h0,jgj) · (
∑
h1,jgj) +
∑
h0,jgj ·m1 +
∑
h1,jgj ·m0 + m0m1
=
∑
h˜jgj + m0m1, for some h˜j .
The homomorphic features follow. Correctness of addition and multiplication for arbitrary numbers
of operands follow from the associative laws of addition and multiplication in P .
Compactness. This scheme is not compact for general circuits. Although additions do not increase
the size of the ciphertext, multiplications square the size of the ciphertext.
Efficiency. If d = 1 and q(λ) = poly(λ) we set n(λ) = Ω(λ) to rule out exhaustive search for the
Gro¨bner basis {x0 − b0, . . . , xn−1 − bn−1} where bi ∈ Fq. Message expansion is nb with b ≥ 1. That
is, encrypting a single field element results in a ciphertext of length
(
n+b
b
)
= O(nb) field elements.
The complexity of both encryption and decryption for fresh ciphertexts are O(nb) ring operations.
Decryption of ciphertexts with µ levels of multiplications require O(n2µb) ring operations.
4.3 Security
As we will show shortly, the above scheme only achieves a weak form of chosen-plaintext security
where a limited number of ciphertexts can be eavesdropped on.
Definition 12 (m-IND-BCPA security). The m-IND-BCPA security of a (homomorphic) symmetric-
key encryption scheme SE for a polynomial m is defined by requiring that the advantage of any PPT
adversary A given by
Advind-bcpam,SE,A (λ) := 2 · Pr
[
IND-BCPAAm,SE(λ)⇒ True
]− 1
is negligible as a function of the security parameter λ. Game IND-BCPAm,SE is shown in Figure 4.
The difference with the usual IND-CPA security is that the adversary can query its encryption oracle
at most m(λ) times.
We sometimes omit the subscript from schemes to ease notation. For example, in the result below,
we have written SPC for SPCP,GBGen(·),d,`,b. The security guarantees are as follows.
Theorem 8. Let A be a PPT adversary against the m-IND-BCPA security of the scheme in Fig-
ure 3. Then there exists a PPT adversary B against the IM problem such that for all λ ∈ N:
Advind-bcpam,SPC,A(λ) =
2 |Q|
|Q| − 1 ·Adv
im
P,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,B(λ).
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Initialize(1λ):
begin
(SK,PK)←$ Gen(1λ);
c←$ {0, 1};
i← 0;
return PK;
end
Encrypt(m):
begin
i← i+ 1;
if i > m(λ) then
return ⊥;
c←$ Enc(m, SK);
return c;
end
Left-Right(m0,m1):
begin
c←$ Enc(mc, SK);
return c;
end
Finalize(c′):
begin
return (c = c′);
end
Fig. 4. Game IND-BCPAm,SE . An adversary is legitimate if it calls oracle Left-Right exactly once
on two message of equal lengths.
Conversely, let A be a PPT adversary against the IM problem. Then there exists a PPT adversary
B against the m-IND-BCPA security of the scheme in Figure 3 such that for all λ ∈ N we have
AdvimP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,m,A(λ) = Adv
ind-bcpa
m,SPC,B(λ).
Proof. The second part of the lemma is clear: the Sample oracle is easily simulated by asking for
encryptions of 0. The Challenge oracle is answered by querying Left-Right on (0, r) where r is
a uniformly chosen nonzero element of the quotient. Now deciding ideal membership directly leads
to a distinguishing attack.
For the first part, we construct an algorithm B attacking the IM problem based on an algorithm A
attacking the scheme as shown in Algorithm 5. To simplify the analysis, we compute the advantage
of B in the IM′ game and deduce the advantage of B in the IM game via Lemma 7.
Algorithm 5: IM adversary B from IND-BCPA adversary A
1 begin
2 B receives (1λ, P );
3 run A(1λ, P ) as follows;
4 if A queries IND-BCPA.Encrypt(m) then
5 query IM.Sample() to get f ; return f + m;
6 if A queries IND-BCPA.Left-Right(m0,m1) then
7 query IM.Challenge() to get f ; c←$ {0, 1}; return f + mc;
8 if A calls IND-BCPA.Finalize(c′) then
9 call IM.Finalize(c = c′);
Now if the sample returned from the Challenge oracle in IM′ to B is uniform in P≤b, then the
probability that c = c′ is 1/2. On the other hand, if the sample is an element of the ideal then
adversary A is run in an environment which is identical to the m-IND-BCPA game. Hence in this
case the probability that c = c′ is equal to the probability that A wins the m-IND-BCPA game.
Switching from IM′ to IM gives a factor |Q||Q|−1 by Lemma 7. The theorem follows. uunionsq
As a corollary, observe that whenm(λ) = O(λb) one can use Corollary 2—which states that Gro¨bner
bases are easy once O(nb) elements from the ideal are available—to construct an adversary which
breaks the IND-BCPAm,SE security of SPC in polynomial time. Thus we can only hope to achieve
bounded security for this scheme.
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5 Symmetric-to-Asymmetric Conversion
Given the security limitation of the symmetric Polly Cracker scheme, the goal for the rest of the
paper is to convert the scheme to one which is not only fully IND-CPA-secure down to the problem
of computing Gro¨bner bases but also is homomorphic and retains its generality. Once we achieve
this, then it is possible to construct a public-key scheme using the additive homomorphic features
of the symmetric scheme by applying various generic conversions. In section we pursue the less
ambitious goal of constructing an additively homomorphic IND-CPA-secure public-key scheme from
SPC. In the literature there are two prominent conversions based on additive homomorphicity:
(A) Publish a set F0 of encryptions of zero as (part of) the public key. To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1}
compute c =
∑
fi∈S fi +m where S is a sparse subset of F0 [64].
(B) Publish two sets F0 and F1 of encryptions of zero and one as (part of) the public key. To encrypt
m ∈ {0, 1} compute c = ∑fi∈S0 fi +∑fj∈S1 fj , with S0 and S1 being sparse subsets of F0 and
F1 respectively such that the parity of |S1| is m. Decryption checks whether Dec(c,SK) is even
or odd [58].
The security of the above transformations rests upon the (computational) indistinguishability of
asymmetric ciphertexts from those produced directly using the symmetric encryption algorithm. As
noted above, since SPC is not IND-CPA-secure the above transformations cannot be used. However,
when applied to a specific scheme, the transformations might still result in secure schemes. Yet, it
can be shown that the security of the transformed schemes are equivalent to that of the underlying
scheme. However, one could envisage a larger class of transformations which might lead to a fully
secure additively homomorphic SE (or equivalently an additively homomorphic PKE) scheme. In
this section we rule out a large class of such transformations. To this end, we consider PKE schemes
which lie within the following design methodology.
1. The secret key is the Gro¨bner basis G of a zero-dimensional ideal I ⊂ P . The decryption
algorithm computes c mod I = c mod G (perhaps together with some post-processing such as
a mod 2 operation). Thus, the message space is (essentially) Q. As before, we assume that
S(I)—and hence Q as a vector space—is known.
2. The public key consists of elements fi ∈ P . We assume that the remainders of these elements
modulo the ideal I, i.e. ri = fi mod I, are known.
3. A ciphertext is computed using ring operations. In other words, it can be expressed as f =∑N−1
i=0 hifi + r. Here fi are as in the public key, hi are some polynomials (possibly depending
on fi), and r is an encoding of the message in Q.
4. The construction of the ciphertext does not encode knowledge of I beyond fi. That is, we have(
N−1∑
i=0
hifi + r
)
mod I =
N−1∑
i=0
hiri + r.
Hence we have that
(∑N−1
i=0 hiri + r
)
∈ Q as an element of P .
5. The security of the scheme relies on the fact that elements f produced at step (3) are compu-
tationally indistinguishable from random elements in P≤b.
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Although conditions 1–3 impose natural algebraic restrictions on the construction, and condition 5
provides a standard way to argue for security, condition 4 imposes some real restrictions on the set
of allowed transformation, but strikes a reasonable balance between allowing a general statement
without ruling out too large a class of conversions. It requires that the ri and r do not encode any
information about the secret key. We currently require this restriction on the “expressive power”
of ri and r so as to make a general impossibility statement. If ri and r produce a nonzero element
in I using some arbitrary algorithm A, we are unable to prove anything about the transformation.
Furthermore, it is plausible that for any given A a similar impossibility result can be obtained if
the remaining conditions hold (although we were unable to prove this).
Note that the two transformations listed above are special linear cases of this methodology. For
transformation (A) we have that fi ∈ I (hence ri = 0), hi ∈ {0, 1}, and r = m. For transforma-
tion (B) we have ri = 0 if fi ∈ F0, ri = 1 if fi ∈ F1, hi ∈ {0, 1}, and r = 0.
To show that any conversion of the above form cannot lead to an IND-CPA-secure public-key scheme,
we will use the following theorem from commutative algebra which was already used in [10] to
discourage the use of Gro¨bner bases in the construction of public-key encryption schemes.
Theorem 9 (Dickenstein et al. [31]). Let I = 〈f0, . . . , fm−1〉 be an ideal in the polynomial ring
P = F[x0, . . . , xn−1], h be such that deg(h) ≤ D, and let h− (h mod I) =
∑m−1
i=0 hifi, where hi ∈ P
and deg(hifi) ≤ D. Let G be the output of some Gro¨bner basis computation algorithm up to degree
D (i.e. all computations with degree greater than D are ignored and dropped). Then h mod I can
be computed by polynomial reduction of h via G.
The main result of this section is a consequence of the above theorem. It essentially states that
uniformly sampling elements of the ideal up to some degree is equivalent to computing a Gro¨bner
basis for the ideal. Note that Theorem 9 in itself does not provide this result, since there is no
assumption about the “quality” of h. Hence, to prove this result we first show that the above
methodology implies sampling as in Theorem 9 but with uniformly random output. Theorem 9
then allows us to compute normal forms, which in turn allows deciding ideal membership with
success probability 1. This together with the fact that h is random allows us to compute a Gro¨bner
basis by Lemma 8. Note that although we arrive at the same impossibility result using Corollary 2,
the approach taken below better highlights the structure of the underlying problem.
Theorem 10. Let G = {g0, . . . , gn−1} be the reduced Gro¨bner basis of a zero-dimensional ideal
I ⊂ P where each deg(gi) ≤ d. Assume that S(I) is known and that Q = P≤b/I has s elements.
Furthermore, let F = {f0, . . . , fN−1} be a set of polynomials with known ri = fi mod I. Let A
be a PPT algorithm which given F produces elements f =
∑
hifi + r with deg(f) ≤ b, hi ∈
P, b ≤ B, deg(hifi) ≤ B, and (f mod I) =
∑
hiri + r. Suppose further that the outputs of A are
computationally indistinguishable from random elements in P≤b. Then there exists an algorithm
which computes a Gro¨bner basis for I from F in O(nωB + |LM(G)| · s · n2b) field operations.
Proof. Let f =
∑N−1
i=0 hifi + r. Writing f˜i = fi− ri, we get that h = f − (f mod I) =
∑N−1
i=0 hif˜i +
r˜ for some r˜ ∈ P≤b/I. Hence h satisfies the condition of Theorem 9, and we can compute the
remainder of all elements of degree b produced by A by computing a Gro¨bner basis up to degree
B. From Theorem 7 we know that this costs O(nωB) field operations. uunionsq
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We now have an algorithm which returns the remainder for arbitrary elements of P≤b with prob-
ability 1. This follows since h is computationally indistinguishable from random elements in P≤b.
More explicitly, we can generate the system parameters, including the Gro¨bner basis, and provide
the algorithm with either an output of A or a random element. We can check for the correctness of
the answer using the basis. Any non-negligible difference in algorithm’s success rate translates to a
break of the indistinguishability of the outputs of A.
Now given an algorithm which computes normal forms, it is trivial to construct an algorithm
which decides ideal membership: compute the normal form and compare with zero. Furthermore,
by Lemma 8, deciding ideal membership with overwhelming probability is equivalent to computing
a Gro¨bner basis by making at most |LM(G)| · s queries to the IM oracle where both |LM(G)| and
s are poly(n). Note that the IM oracle constructed here has success probability 1. Each IM query
costs at most
(
n+b
b
)2
= O(n2b) field operations. Therefore the overall cost of the second step is
O(|LM(G)| · s · n2b). In fact, this last step is unnecessary, since it can be shown that the output of
the Gro¨bner basis computation up to degree B is a Gro¨bner basis for I. In any case, the overall
complexity is O(nωB) for the first step and O(|LM(G)| · s · n2b) for the second step with b ≤ B
from which an overall complexity of O(nωB + |LM(G)| · s · n2b) follows. uunionsq
Therefore, if for some degree b ≥ d computationally uniform elements of P≤b can be produced
using the public key f0, . . . , fN−1, there is an attacker which recovers the secret key g0, . . . , gn−1 in
essentially the same complexity. Hence, while conceptually simple and provably secure up to some
bound, our symmetric Polly Cracker scheme SPCP,GBGen(·),d,`,b does not provide a valid building
block for constructing a fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. We also stress that SPC
is secure down to the IM problem with noticeable advantage, but in order to construct an adversary
against the GB problem we need an IM oracle with overwhelming advantage.
Remark. Although the above impossibility result is presented for public-key encryption schemes,
due to the equivalence result of [58], it also rules out the existence of additively homomorphic
symmetric Polly Cracker-style schemes with full IND-CPA security.
Our goal now is to achieve full IND-CPA security for a symmetric Polly Cracker-type scheme down
to the hardness of computing Gro¨bner bases. To this end, we introduce noisy variants of GB and
IM in the next section. These variants ensure that the conditions of Theorem 10 do not hold any
more. In particular, the condition that ri = fi mod I are known will be no longer valid.
6 Gro¨bner Bases with Noise
In this section, we introduce noisy variants of the problems presented in Section 3. The goal is to
lift the restriction on the number of samples that the adversary can obtain and, following a similar
design methodology to Polly Cracker, construct an IND-CPA-secure scheme. Put differently, we
consider problems that naturally arise if we consider noisy encoding of messages in SPC. Similarly
to [64,57] we expect a problem which is efficiently solvable in the noise-free setting to be also hard
in the noisy setting. We will justify this assumption in Section 6.1 by arguing that our construction
can be seen as a generalisation of [64,57].
The games below will be parametrised by a noise distribution χ. The discrete Gaussian distribution
is of particular interest to us.
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Definition 13 (Discrete Gaussian distribution). Let α > 0 be a real number and q ∈ N. The
discrete Gaussian distribution χα,q, is a Gaussian distribution rounded to the nearest integer and
reduced modulo q with mean zero and standard deviation αq.
In what follows we assume that χ is defined over Q, i.e. for d > 1 we have that χ is a multidi-
mensional noise distribution. For example, χ may simply consist of |S(I)≤b| independent discrete
Gaussian distributions, one for each m ∈ S(I)≤b. However, as pointed out in [50] simply using
the same Gaussian on each monomial is possibly not the best choice. Another notable special case
is q = 2. In this case, χα,2 is a Bernoulli distribution with just one parameter 0 < p < 1, the
probability that 1 is returned.
We now define a noisy variant of the Gro¨bner basis problem. The task here is still to compute a
Gro¨bner basis for some ideal I. However, we are now only given access to a noisy sample oracle
which provides polynomials which are not necessarily in I but rather are “close” approximations
to elements of I. Here the term “close” is made precise using a noise distribution χ on Q.
Definition 14 (The Gro¨bner basis with noise (GBN) problem). The Gro¨bner basis with
noise problem is defined through game GBNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ shown in Figure 5. The advantage of a
PPT algorithm A in solving the GBN problem is
AdvgbnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ) := Pr
[
GBNAP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ(λ)⇒ True
]
.
Initialize(1λ,P, d):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
return (1λ, P );
end
Sample():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
e←$ χ;
f ← f − (f mod G) + e;
return f ;
end
Finalize(G′):
begin
return (G = G′);
end
Fig. 5. Game GBNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ.
The essential difference between the noisy and noise-free versions of the Gro¨bner basis problem
is that by adding noise we have eliminated the restriction on the adversary to call the Sample
oracle a bounded number of times. Put differently, if χ is the delta distribution, the GBN problem
degenerates to the GB problem with an unbounded number of samples. Hence, in this case the GBN
problem is easy. On the other hand if χ is uniform, the GBN problem is information-theoretically
hard. Thus, the choice of χ greatly influences the hardness of the GBN problem. We leave an
in-depth investigation of the noise parameter to future work.
As in the noise-free setting, we can ask various questions about the ideal I generated by G. One
such example is solving the ideal membership problem with access to noisy samples from I. In
our definition the adversary wins the game if it can distinguish whether an element was sampled
uniformly from P≤b or from I≤b + χ.
Definition 15 (The ideal membership with noise (IMN) problem). The ideal membership
with noise problem is defined through game IMNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ shown in Figure 6. The advantage
of a PPT algorithm A in solving the IMN problem is defined by
AdvimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ) := 2 · Pr
[
IMNAP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ(λ)⇒ True
]
− 1.
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Initialize(1λ,P, d):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
c←$ {0, 1};
return (1λ, P );
end
Sample():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
if c = 1 then
e←$ χ;
f ′ ← f mod G;
f ← f − f ′ + e;
return f ;
end
Finalize(c′):
begin
return (c′ = c);
end
Fig. 6. Game IMNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ. The adversary may call Sample multiple times.
Our definition of the IMN problem can be seen as an instantiation of Gentry’s ideal coset prob-
lem [39] since both problems require distinguishing uniformly chosen elements in P≤b from those
in I≤b + χ.
Now, a pressing question is equivalence of the GBN and the IMN problem, i.e. decision-to-search
reduction. We have been able to prove this equivalence in the special case d = 1 (see below).
Intuitively, a straightforward reduction fails when d > 1 because an IMN oracle does not have
to consider the coefficient of every monomial in S(I)≤b when deciding ideal membership to be
successful. On the other hand, a GBN oracle must recover coefficients of all monomial. For example,
let G = {x0+s0xn−1, . . . , xn−2+sn−2xn−1, x2n−1+sn−1xn−1} and hence S(I)≤b = {xn−1, 1}. Assume
the noise distribution χ is such that the coefficient for xn−1 of the noise is uniform ∈ Fq, while the
constant coefficient is always zero. For this shape and noise, it is easy to solve the IMN problem:
any f ∈ P≤b with a nonzero constant coefficient is not an element of I = 〈G〉. However, turning
this oracle into an adversary against the GBN problem would require to recover all si which are not
even considered by IMN. Furthermore, the coefficients of xn−1 are information-theoretically hidden,
so the distribution on I≤b + χ does not even depend on the si (cf. [46]).
In fact, this type of counterexample is essentially the only thing that can go wrong: for a weaker
variant of the IMN problem, which we aptly call the weak IMN problem (and define below in such
a way to ensure that the adversary has to consider all monomials) we are able to show a reduction
to the GBN problem. In this definition we let s := dim(Q) = |S(I)≤b|, which is independent of the
randomness of GBGen(·). Given χ, we also define the distributions χt for t ∈ S(I)≤b by sampling
an element e from Q according to χ and setting all but the coefficient corresponding to t to some
independent uniform values.2 Hence, all coefficients except that corresponding to t are information-
theoretically blinded. Any algorithm which can distinguish samples following I≤b+χt from uniform
samples in P≤b for all t can be used to solve the GBN problem.
Definition 16 (The weak ideal membership with noise (WIMN) problem). The weak ideal
membership with noise problem is defined through games WIMNG,χ,t? for t
? ∈ S(I)≤b shown in
2 Since the noise distribution χ only enters our construction via χt, this has the side effect of removing all dependencies
between the coefficients. In particular, we may as well assume that χ samples the coefficients of all monomials t
independently.
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Figure 7. The advantage of a PPT algorithm A in solving the WIMN problem is defined by
AdvwimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ) := E
G
[
min
t?
(
2 · Pr [WIMNAG,χ,t?(λ)⇒ True]− 1)] ,
where the expectation is taken over G sampled from GBGen(1λ, P, d, `).
Initialize(G,χ, t?):
begin
c←$ {0, 1};
return (1λ, P, t?);
end
Sample(t):
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
e←$ χt;
f ′ ← f mod G;
f ← f − f ′ + e;
return f ;
end
Challenget? ():
begin
f ←$ P≤b;
if c = 1 then
e←$ χt
?
;
f ′ ← f mod G;
f ← f − f ′ + e;
return f ;
end
Finalize(c′):
begin
return (c′ = c);
end
Fig. 7. Games WIMNG,χ,t? . In each game, the adversary may call Sample with any monomials
t ∈ S(I)≤b multiple times and Challenget? once.
Our definition of advantage is somewhat non-standard but it bears similarities to game definitions in
recent work on multi-instance security [13]. Indeed, we require that only those WIMN adversaries
win the overall game which work for all t? ∈ S(I)≤b for a particular Gro¨bner basis G. As we
shall see, only such adversaries allow us to recover the full Gro¨bner basis. Also, we note that the
term “weak” is justified by the relation between WIMN and IMN. It is easy to see that if the
IMN problem is hard, then so is the WIMN problem, while, as we have seen, the converse is not
necessarily true. Finally, if d = 1 the IMN and WIMN problems are equivalent. We answer queries
to WIMN’s Challenget? and Sample oracles with answers from IMN’s Sample oracle. If IMN’s
Sample follows I + χ, WIMN runs in the right environment. If IMN’s Sample follows a uniform
distribution on P≤b then WIMN’s receives no information about the problem instance and hence
has advantage zero.
We next show that when q and |S(I)≤b| are polynomial in λ and the WIMN problem is hard, the
GBN problem is also hard. The intuition behind the reduction is that the adversary can exhaustively
search for the coefficients for each monomial t ∈ S(I)≤b independently and then use the WIMN
solver for t to verify its guess. This is formalised in the lemma below.
Lemma 9. (WIMN easy =⇒ GBN easy) Suppose the finite field size q and |S(I)≤b| are polyno-
mial in λ. Then for any polynomial p and any PPT adversary A against the WIMN problem there
exists a PPT adversary B against the GBN problem such that
AdvgbnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,B(λ) ≥ (1− o(1)) ·AdvwimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ) + negl(λ)
for all values of λ ∈ N such that
AdvwimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ) ≥ 1p(λ) .
Proof. We construct an adversary B against GBN from adversary A against WIMN in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 runs A in the environment it expects. This is clear for calls to the Sample(t) oracle.
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For the Challenget?() oracles, first assume that we guessed correctly and β is the coefficient of t
?
of gi ∈ G with leading monomial m. Since gi and m + β · t? differ only by an element in Q with
coefficient 0 for t?, which is blinded by e, the challenge f + a · (m + β · t?) + e follows the same
distribution as f + a · gi + e. This in turn has the same distribution as I + χt? as required. On the
other hand, if we guessed incorrectly then f + a · (m + b · t?) + e is uniform as a is independently
uniform in Fq and e is independently uniform for all coefficients of the quotient 6= t?. Hence, A
either sees elements following I + χt? or uniform in P≤b.
Algorithm 6: GBN adversary B from WIMN adversary A
1 begin
2 B receives (1λ, P );
3 G′ ← ∅;
4 for m ∈ LM(G) do
5 r ← 0;
6 for t? ∈ S(I)≤b do
7 for β ∈ Fq do
8 Cβ ← 0;
9 for i ∈ {1, . . . , λp(λ)2} do // amplification
10 run A(1λ, P, t?) as follows:
11 if A queries WIMN.Sample(t) then
12 query GBN.Sample() to get f ;
13 e← random polynomial ∈ Q but coefficient 0 for t;
14 answer A’s query with f + e;
15 if A queries WIMN.Challenget?() then
16 a←$ Fq;
17 e← random polynomial ∈ Q but coefficient 0 for t?;
18 query GBN.Sample() to get f ;
19 return f + a · (m+ β · t?) + e;
20 if A calls WIMN.Finalize(c′) then
21 if c′ = 1 then // β · t? likely a correct guess
22 Cβ ← Cβ + 1;
23 break;
24 r ← r + β˜ · t? for a maximal Cβ˜ ; // majority vote
25 G′ ← G′ ∪ {m+ r};
26 call GBN.Finalize(G′);
Algorithm 6 runs in polynomial time. The outer loop terminates after at most |LM(G)| = n(λ)
iterations. The two inner loops terminate after at most |S(I)| and q iterations, both of which are
polynomial in λ by assumption.
Algorithm 6 is correct and returns the reduced Gro¨bner basis G′ such that 〈G′〉 = I. For this,
first note that whenever we make a fixed wrong guess β, the distribution of the challenge f + a ·
(m+ β · t?) + e presented to A does not depend on the value of β due to the multiplication by the
uniform a. As a consequence, we can amplify the success probability of A by r(λ) = p(λ)2λ-fold
repetition: Call G good if the minimal (over t?) conditional advantage of A (conditioned on G) is
at least 1p(λ) log λ . By a standard argument, the probability that G is good must then be at least
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(1− 1log λ)AdvwimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,A(λ). For those good G, our choice of number of repetitions r is large
enough to amplify the advantage A to overwhelming using Chernoff–Hoeffding bounds. Hence in
each majority vote we will pick the correct value with overwhelming probability, so G′ = G holds
with overwhelming probability for good G, which finishes the proof. uunionsq
Remark. In the lemma above, we were able to amplify the success probability of any adversary
which solves the WIMN problem with non-negligible advantage to one which has an overwhelming
advantage via Chernoff bounds, since we have no a priori bound on the number of queries as we had
in the noiseless setting. In contrast to Lemma 8 we also do not require |Q| to be polynomial in λ but
only |S(I)≤b| and the field size q. Finally, because WIMN treats every monomial t? independently,
“structural errors” as in described after Lemma 8 are ruled out.
We note that when d = 1 Lemma 9 implies IMN is hard if GBN is hard, as in this case WIMN and
IMN are equivalent. Furthermore, it is easy to see that in this case a converse reduction can also
be constructed because a WIMN adversary expects samples from Sample(1) which GBN’s Sample
oracle returns. Hence, for d = 1 we an equivalence between the IMN, WIMN, and GBN problems
holds. Moreover, in this case, we can also demonstrate an average-case-to-worst-case reduction
analogous to that known for the LWE problem. That is, for d = 1 we show below that if we can
solve the IMN problem for a polynomial fraction of instances, then we can also solve it for all
instances.
Lemma 10 (Average-case-to-worst-case reduction for d = 1). Let A be a PPT adversary
against GBNP,GBGendense(·),1,`,b,χ that is successful for a polynomial fraction of all secrets. Then there
exists a PPT adversary B which solves GBNP,G,1,`,b,χ on all instances G. That is, the basis is no
longer sampled at random, but is fixed to be a specific value G. More precisely
AdvgbnP,G,1,`,b,χ,B(λ) = 1− negl(λ)
for all values of G, provided that AdvgbnP,GBGendense(·),1,`,b,χ,A(λ) >
1
p(λ) for a polynomial p.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of [57, Lemma 3.2]. The idea is to find a suitable class of
transformations which allow us to randomise a specific Gro¨bner basis G. We remark that G should
be a valid output of GBGendense() for d = 1: it is of the form G = Gs := [x0 − s0, . . . , xn−1 − sn−1]
where si ∈ F. We also denote by Is the ideal generated by Gs and by J = Is,≤b +χ the probability
distribution on P≤b presented to B. We consider the transformation Lt : P −→ P defined by
Lt(f) := f(t) for any t := (x0 − t0, x1 − t1, . . . , xn−1 − tn−1) with ti ∈ Fq.
We remark that the image I ′ of Is under Lt is Is+t (i.e. the ideal generated by Gs+t). Indeed, since
Lt is a bijection, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the zeroes of I ′ and Is. This implies
that the variety corresponding to I ′ only consists of the single element s + t. Therefore, the unique
Gro¨bner basis of I ′ is Gs+t, and I ′ = Is+t. Therefore, Lt allows to map Is + χ to Is+t + χ. It is
clear that Gs+t is a valid output of GBGendense(). Moreover, the distribution of Gs+t is uniform on
the image of GBGendense().
Now, we use A a polynomial number of times on Lt(J ), each using a freshly chosen and uniform
t←$ Fn. With overwhelming probability, A will output the correct Gro¨bner basis Gs+t at least
once, from which we can recover s (and hence Gs) and verify against J .
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Note that we can verify in PPT whether a given s′ is correct for J = Is,≤b +χ. Indeed, as soon as
s = s′ then J (s′)—the evaluation of polynomials distributed according to J on s′—is distributed
according to χ, because Is(s′) = 0. In contrast, whenever s 6= s′, J (s′) = Is,≤b(s′) + χ is uniform.
This is the case, because the evaluation of a polynomial at a given point is a surjective linear map
from Is,≤b to F, and such maps preserve the uniform distribution. Hence, to verify that a given s′ is
correct for J we have to decide whether each polynomial in J (s′) is uniform or follows χ. We can
obtain overwhelming confidence in polynomial time if χ is a Gaussian distribution [56, Lemma 3.6].
More generally, we may use A to verify in PPT whether a given s′ is correct for J = Is,≤b + χ for
any distribution χ. Indeed, to verify s′ against s, we test whether the probability that A returns
Gu when presented with samples from Iu,≤b + J (s′) for a uniform u ∈ Fn is ≥ 1p or equal to 1qn .
Since 1p − 1qn is noticeable, we can obtain overwhelming confidence in polynomial time. uunionsq
We note that this proof strategy does not apply to d > 1 for two reasons. First, it is not necessarily
true that we have more maps Lt than secrets as the space of the secrets increases with d but the
number of maps does not. Second, if we have noise on non-constant coefficients our maps change
the noise distribution.
6.1 Hardness assumptions and justifications
In this subsection we investigate the hardness of the GBN, WIMN, and IMN problems. We first
consider the GBN problem and relate it to the well-established LWE problem [57]. Then, we discuss
the relation between the GBN problem and various approximate GCD problems [64]. Third, we
discuss the special case q = 2 by relating the GBN problem to the well-known Max-3SAT problem,
and more generally when d = 1 to Max-MQ, the problem of finding an assignment for polynomials
f0, . . . , fm−1 ∈ Fq[x0, . . . , xn−1] such that the majority of them evaluate to zero. Finally, we consider
known attacks against the GBN problem. We start by recalling the LWE problem.
Definition 17 (The learning with errors (LWE) problem). The LWE problem is defined
though game LWEn,q,χ shown in Figure 8. The advantage of a PPT algorithm A in solving LWE is
Advlwen,q,χ,A(λ) := Pr
[
LWEAn,q,χ(λ)⇒ True
]
.
Initialize(1λ):
begin
n← n(λ);
s←$ Znq ;
return (1λ, n);
end
Sample():
begin
a←$ Znq ;
e←$ χ;
b← e+∑i aisi;
return (a, b);
end
Finalize(s′):
begin
return s = s′;
end
Fig. 8. Game LWEn,q,χ.
From the definition of LWE it is easy to see that GBN can be considered as a nonlinear generalisation
of LWE if q is a prime. In other words, we have equivalence between these problems if we consider
b = d = 1 in GBN. This is formalised in the next lemma.
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Lemma 11 (LWE hard =⇒ GBN hard for b = d = 1). Let q be a prime. Then for any PPT
adversary A against the GBN problem3 with b = d = 1, there exists a PPT adversary B against the
LWE problem such that
AdvgbnP,GBGen(·),1,`,1,χ,A(λ) = Adv
lwe
n,q,χ,B(λ).
Proof. We construct an adversary B against the LWE problem based on an adversary A against
the GBN problem for d = 1 and b = 1. Algorithm B initialises A with P . Whenever A calls its
Sample oracle, B queries its own Sample oracle to obtain (a, b) where a = (a0, . . . , an−1). It
returns
∑
aixi − b to A. This is a valid GBN sample of degree b = 1. The Challenge oracle is
answered similarly. When A calls its Finalize on G, since d = 1, we can assume w.l.o.g. that G is
of the form [x0− s0, . . . , xn−1− sn−1] with si ∈ Fq. Algorithm B terminates by calling its Finalize
oracle on s = (s0, . . . , sn−1).
Adversary B is successful whenever A is. Indeed, from ∑ aixi − b = 0 it follows that ∑ aisi = e
and hence that s satisfies the LWE samples (a,
∑
aisi + e). Finally, it is easy to see that B runs in
polynomial time and uses polynomially many samples. uunionsq
This result can be generalised to any b = d if we allow ` = n and consider the amortised variant of
Regev’s LWE scheme from [55] where each monomial m of Q<b corresponds to one parallel instance
of Regev’s original scheme. Note, however, that ` = n implies an exponentially large quotient.
Lemma 12 (LWE hard =⇒ GBN hard for b = d, ` = n, and GBGen(·) = GBGendense(·)).
Let q be a prime, and assume χ outputs e←$ χ , e =
∑
m∈Q em · m, where the em are chosen
independently, their distribution possibly depending on m. Then for any PPT adversary A against
the GBN problem with b = d, ∃ PPT adversary B against the amortised LWE from [55] such that
AdvgbnP,GBGendense(·),d,n,b,χ,A(λ) ≤ Adv
lwe
n,q,χ,B(λ).
Proof (Sketch). Samples from GBN if b = d are necessarily of the form c =
∑
tigi + e where
ti ∈ Fq. Write c =
∑
cmm where the sum is over all monomials in c. The coefficients ∈ Q of c are
cm˜ =
∑
tigi,m˜ + em˜ where m˜ ∈ Q, gi,m˜ is the coefficient for m˜ in gi, and em˜ is the coefficient of
m˜ in e. These are noisy random linear combinations of the secrets gi,m˜ as in LWE. For m˜ ∈ Q<b,
the gi,m˜ are uniform. All monomials 6∈ Q are of the form xdi and we have that the coefficient of
xdi = LM(gi) is ti, exactly as in the amortised construction from [55]. uunionsq
Note that for coefficients m˜ ∈ Q=b, we can get LWE instances where some of the secret coefficients
gi,m˜ are always zero and so these instances will be easier, which is why we don’t have equality
between the advantages above.
Relation to the approximate GCD problem. The GBN problem for n = 1 is the approx-
imate GCD problem over Fq[x]. Contrary to the approximate GCD problem over the integers
(cf. [64,26,24,25]), this problem has not yet received much attention (a variant of this problem
is investigated in [25]), and hence it is unclear under which parameters it is hard. However, as
mentioned in Section 2, the notion of a Gro¨bner basis can be extended to Z[x0, . . . , xn−1], which
3 Here P is a distribution which returns P = Fq[x0, . . . , xn−1] with q as in the LWE game. Algorithm GBGen(·)
returns [x0 − s0, . . . , xn−1 − sn−1] for some si ∈ Fq, which is the only choice for d = 1.
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in turn implies a version of the GBN problem over Z. This can be seen as a direct generalisation of
the approximate GCD problem in Z.
The q = 2 case. Recall that if b = d = 1 we have an equivalence with the LWE problem (or
the well-known problem of learning parity with noise if q = 2). More generally, for d = 1 we can
reduce Max-3SAT instances to GBN instances by translating each clause individually to a Boolean
polynomial. However, in Max-3SAT the number of samples is bounded and hence this reduction only
shows the hardness of GBN with a bounded number of samples. Still, the Gro¨bner basis returned by
an arbitrary algorithm A solving GBN using a bounded number of samples will provide a solution
to the Max-3SAT problem. Vice versa, we may convert a GBN instance for d = 1 to a Max-3SAT
instance (more precisely a Partial Max-SAT instance where some clauses must be satisfied) by
running an ANF-to-CNF conversion algorithm [6].
The d = 1 case. When d = 1 the GBN problem is closely related to the Max-MQ problem. In [45]
it was shown that if all fi are square-free it is NP-hard to approximate this problem to within a
factor of q− for  a small positive number. Latter [67] proves that the minimal approximation ratio
that can be achieved in polynomial time for Max-MQ is q. The most significant difference between
GBN for d = 1 and Max-MQ is that the latter treats polynomials either as correct or incorrect, and
no notion of “smallness” of noise exists. It follows from the properties of the Gaussian distribution
that a Max-MQ oracle solves the GBN problem for d = 1.
Known attacks. Finally, we consider known attacks to understand the difficulty of the GBN
problem. Recall, that if b = d = 1 Lemma 11 states that we can solve the LWE problem if we can
solve the GBN problem. Conversely, for any b ≥ d and d = 1 the best known attack against the GBN
problem is to reduce it to the LWE problem similarly to the linearisation technique used for solving
nonlinear systems of equations in the noise-free setting. Let N =
(
n+b
b
)
be the number of monomials
up to degree b. LetM : P −→ FNq be a mapping of polynomials in P to vectors in FNq by assigning
to the ith component of the image vector the coefficient of the ith monomial ∈M≤b. Then, in order
to reduce GBN with n variables and degree b to LWE with N variables, reply to each LWE Sample
query by calling GBN’s Sample oracle to retrieve f , computing v = M(f) and returning (a, b)
with a := (vN−1, . . . , v1) and b := −v0. When the LWE adversary queries Finalize on s, query
GBN’s Finalize oracle with [x0 − s0, . . . , xn−1 − sn−1]. Correctness follows from the correctness of
linearisation in the noise-free setting [4]. Furthermore, the LWE problem in N variables and with
respect to the discrete Gaussian noise distribution χα,q is considered to be hard if
α ≥ 3
2
·max
(
1
q
, 2−2
√
N log q log δ
)
for an appropriate choice of δ, which is the quality of the approximation for the shortest vector
problem. With the current lattice algorithms δ = 1.01 is hard, and δ = 1.005 is infeasible [52].
Perhaps the most interesting attack on the LWE problem from the perspective of this work is that
due to Arora and Ge [4]. This attack reduces the problem of solving linear systems with noise to the
problem of solving (structured) nonlinear noise-free systems. We may apply this technique directly
to GBN, i.e. without going through LWE first, and reduce it to GB with large b. However, it seems
this approach does not improve the asymptotic complexity of the attack. Finally, certain conditions
to rule out exhaustive search for the noise (and reduction to a noise-free system) must be imposed.
We conclude this section by explicitly stating our hardness assumption.
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Definition 18 (The GBN and WIMN assumptions). Let b, d ∈ N with b ≥ d. Let P be a
polynomial ring distribution and χα,q be the discrete Gaussian distribution. Suppose the parameters
n, α, and q (all being a function of λ) satisfy the following set of conditions:
1. n ≥ b√λ to rule out linearisation attacks.
2. GBGen(·) is instantiated with GBGendense(·), and q and |S(I)≤b| are poly(λ) such that Lemma 9
applies.
3. (αq)nd
` ≈ 2λ so exhaustive search over the noise or the secret key is ruled out.
4. For N :=
(
n+b
b
)
, α and q are chosen such that the advantage of any PPT algorithm in solving
the LWE problem with dimension N , modulus q and noise distribution χα,q is negligible as a
function of λ.
Then the advantage of any PPT algorithm in solving the GBN or the WIMN problem is negligible
as a function of λ.
7 Polly Cracker with Noise
We present a fully IND-CPA-secure Polly Cracker-style symmetric encryption scheme and prove it
secure down to the hardness of the GBN problem. Our parameterised scheme, SPCNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,
is shown in Figure 9. Here we represent elements in Fq as integers in the interval [−b q2c, b q2c]. This
convention is also used in the definition of noise. All the computations are performed in the ring P
as generated by Gen. Furthermore, we assume that gcd(q, 2) = 1. This condition is needed for the
correctness and the security of our scheme. The message space is F2 (although we note that this
can be generalised to other small fields).
Correctness of evaluation. For any choice of d, SPCNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ is additively homo-
morphic. However, to achieve multiplicative homomorphicity we need to set d = 1 as in Section 4.
Hence, we restrict our attention to d = 1 and define the size of the noise as the logarithm of distance
to zero over the integers. Addition and multiplication of the two ciphertexts c0 =
∑
h0,jgj+2e0+m0
and c1 =
∑
h1,jgj + 2e1 + m1 are given by
c0 + c1 =
∑
h0,jgj + 2e0 + m0 +
∑
h1,jgj + 2e1 + m1
=
∑
(h0,j + h1,j)gj + 2(e0 + e1) + (m0 + m1),
c0 · c1 = (
∑
h0,jgj + 2e0 + m0) · (
∑
h1,jgj + 2e1 + m1)
= (
∑
h0,jgj) · (
∑
h1,jgj + 2e1 + m1)
+ (2e0 + m0) · (
∑
h1,jgj)
+ (4e0e1 + 2e0m1 + 2e1m0 + m0m1)
=
∑
h˜jgj + 2(2e0e1 + e0m1 + e1m0) + m0m1 for some h˜j .
The homomorphic features follow. Correctness of addition and multiplication for arbitrary numbers
of operands follow from the associative laws of addition and multiplication in P up to overflows.
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GenP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ(1λ):
begin
P ←$ Pλ;
G←$ GBGen(1λ, P, d, `);
SK← (G,P, b, χ);
PK← (P, b, χ);
return (SK,PK);
end
Enc(m, SK):
begin
G← SK;
pick mt ∈ {0, 1} s.t. m = ⊕t∈S(I)≤bmt;
for t ∈ S(I)≤b do
f ←$ P≤b;
f ← f − (f mod G);
e←$ χt;
ct ← f + 2e+ mt · t;
return (ct)t∈S(I)≤b ;
end
Dec((ct)t∈S(I)≤b , SK):
begin
G← SK;
for t ∈ S(I)≤b do
rt ← ct mod G;
m′t ← coeff. of t in rt;
mt ← m′t mod 2;
return ⊕t∈S(I)≤bmt;
end
Eval(c0, . . . , ct−1, C,PK):
begin
apply Add and Mult gates
of C over P for each
index t independently;
return the result;
end
Fig. 9. The symmetric Polly Cracker with noise scheme, SPCNP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ.
Permitted circuits. Circuits composed of Add and Mult gates can be seen as multivariate
Boolean polynomials in t variables over F2. We can consider the generalisation of this set of poly-
nomials to Fq (i.e., when the coefficients are in Fq). In order to define the set of permitted circuits
(which will be parametrised by α > 0) we first embed the Boolean polynomials into the ring of
polynomials over Z. For χα,q, the probability of noise being larger than kαq is at most exp(−k2/2).
We say that a circuit is valid if for any (s0, . . . , st−1) with si ≤ tαq the outputs are less than q for
some parameter t. This restriction ensures that no overflows occur when polynomials are evaluated
over Fq. Section 9 discusses how to set α and q in order to allow for evaluation of polynomials of
some fixed degree µ.
Compactness. Additions do not increase the size of the ciphertext, but they do increase the size
of the error by at most one bit. Multiplications square the size of the ciphertext and increase the bit
size of the noise by approximately log(8e0e1) bits The theorem below states the security properties
of the above scheme.
Theorem 11. Let b ≥ d be arbitrary and let A be a PPT adversary against the IND-CPA security
of the scheme in Figure 9. Then there exists a PPT adversary B against the WIMN problem such
that for all λ ∈ N we have
Advind-cpaSPCN ,A(λ) = 2 ·AdvwimnP,GBGen(·),d,`,b,χ,B(λ).
Proof. We construct an algorithm B against the WIMN problem for some arbitrary but fixed t? ∈
S(I)≤b based on A attacking the IND-CPA security of the scheme. Roughly speaking, this algorithm
runs A and answers its encryption queries using the provided sample oracle. Algorithm B answers
A’s left-or-right query by constructing the ciphertext components for t ∈ S(I)≤b using its sample
oracle when t 6= t?, and its challenge oracle when t = t?. See Algorithm 7 for the details.
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Algorithm 7: WIMNt? adversary B from IND-CPA adversary A
1 begin
2 B receives (1λ, P );
3 run A(1λ, P ) as follows;
4 if A queries IND-CPA.Encrypt(m) then
5 pick mt ∈ {0, 1} s.t. m = ⊕t∈S(I)≤bmt;
6 for t ∈ S(I)≤b do
7 query WIMN.Sample(t) to get f ;
8 ct ← 2f + mt · t;
9 return (ct)t∈S(I)≤b ;
10 if A queries IND-CPA.Left-Right(m0,m1) then
11 c←$ {0, 1};
12 pick mt ∈ {0, 1} s.t. mc = ⊕t∈S(I)≤bmt;
13 for t ∈ S(I)≤b do
14 if t = t? then
15 query WIMN.Challenget?() to get f ;
16 else
17 query WIMN.Sample(t) to get f ;
18 ct ← 2f + mt · t;
19 return (ct)t∈S(I)≤b ;
20 if A calls IND-CPA.Finalize(c′) then
21 call Finalize(c = c′);
Algorithm 7 is correct. If the samples returned by the Challenget? oracle to B are uniform in P≤b,
then the probability that c = c′ is 1/2. On the other hand, if the sample is a noisy element of the
ideal, then adversary A is run in an environment which is identical to the IND-CPA game. Note
that since gcd(q, 2) = 1, multiplications by 2 at lines 9 and 19 do not affect the distribution of f
(apart from doubling the noise, which is necessary to get the IND-CPA game environment). Hence
in this case the probability that c = c′ is equal to the probability that A wins the IND-CPA game.
The theorem follows. uunionsq
The above theorem, Lemma 9 and the recent results in [58] which establish the equivalence of
symmetric and asymmetric homomorphic encryption schemes leads to the first provably secure
public-key encryption scheme reducible to the hardness of computing Gro¨bner bases for random
systems. This provides a positive answer to the challenges raised by Barkee et al. [10] (and later
also by Gentry [39]). We note here that the transformation – as briefly described in Section 5 –
only uses the additive features of the scheme and does not require full homomorphicity.
8 Trading Degrees for Noise
The product of two polynomials of degree b is a polynomial of degree 2b, and hence the size of
the ciphertext squares if two ciphertexts are multiplied together. In this section, we discuss how to
reduce polynomials of degree b to polynomials of degree b′ by performing proxy re-encryption. Proxy
re-encryption allows to transform a ciphertext intended for a party A to a ciphertext for a party
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B with the help of a (unidirectional) re-encryption key KA→B. Hence, after each multiplication we
can apply this re-encryption for KA→A to reduce the size of our ciphertexts at the cost of increasing
the noise.
We discuss how one can achieve the above functionality for our scheme. Since the construction only
uses additions, this feature also applies to the LWE-based encryption scheme as previously observed
in 4. Let P = Fq[x0, . . . , xn−1] and suppose that GA = {g0, . . . , gn−1} and GB = {h0, . . . , hn−1} are
two (possibly distinct) Gro¨bner bases for ideals IA ⊂ P and IB ⊂ P . Finally, suppose P/IA = P/IB
as vector spaces (the equality always holds for d = 1). To re-encrypt a ciphertext intended for GA
under key GB we first generate a re-encryption key GA→B using Algorithm 8, and then use this
key in Algorithm 9 – the re-encryption algorithm – to obtain a ciphertext under GB.
The central idea behind these algorithms is the equivalence between different representations of
elements in P/I. While for the most part of this work we identify elements in P/I with elements
f mod I, Algorithms 8 and 9 make use of different representations of elements in P/I. For example,
if x+ 1 is an element of a Gro¨bner basis GA, both f = x and r = −1 represent the same element in
P/IA since f mod GA = r, i.e. x mod GA = −1. Hence, if we are interested in P/IA (our messages
live in P/I) we can use f and r interchangeably. That is, for some f = ∑ cimi with monomials
mi and coefficients ci ∈ Fq, we can compute the first decryption step, i.e. m + 2e = f mod IA, as∑
(cimi mod IA). Furthermore, since P/IA = P/IB, we may encrypt the encoded message m + 2e
for GB by computing
f ′ = (f mod IA) + f˜ =
∑
(cimi mod IA) + f˜ = m + 2e+ f˜ for f˜ ∈ IB.
Hence, we get that f ′ mod IB = f mod IA.
Algorithm 8: Generating a re-encryption key (Re-encryptionKey)
Input: GA – a Gro¨bner basis
Input: f ′0, . . . , f
′
s−1 – polynomials of degree b
′ encrypting zero under a Gro¨bner basis GB
Input: b – a bound on the degree of polynomials
Input: y – sparsity parameter
1 begin
2 GA→B ← ∅;
3 for m ∈M≤b do
4 m′ ← m mod GA;
5 for 0 ≤ j < dlog2(q/2)e do
6 s←$ a sparse subset of {0, . . . , s− 1} of size y;
7 f ′2j ·m ←
∑
i∈s f
′
i ;
8 GA→B [2j ·m]← f ′2j ·m + 2j ·m′;
9 return GA→B ;
Now, using the key GA→B we may re-encrypt a ciphertext f under GA to a ciphertext f ′ under
GB using Algorithm 9.
Lemma 13. Let GA be a Gro¨bner basis. Let f
′
0, . . . , f
′
s−1 be polynomials of degree b′ encrypting
zero under a Gro¨bner basis GB. We set GA→B = Re-encryptionKey(GA, [f0, . . . , fs−1], b, y) for some
4 http://xagawa.net/pdf/20100120_SCIS_PRE.pdf
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Algorithm 9: Re-encryption
Input: f – a polynomial in P of degree at most b
Input: GA→B – a re-encryption key from key GA to key GB
1 begin
2 f ′ ← 0;
3 for monomials m appearing in f do
4 c← the coefficient in f of m, represented as an integer in (−b q
2
c, b q
2
c];
5 m′ ← 0;
6 for 0 ≤ j < dlog2(q/2)e do
7 if the jth bit of |c| is set then
8 m′ ← m′ +GA→B [2j ·m];
9 if c < 0 then
10 m′ ← −1 ·m′;
11 f ′ ← f ′ +m′;
12 return f ′;
b > 0 and y > 0. Finally, let f be an encryption of m under key GA with deg(f) ≤ b. It holds
that f ′ = Re-encryptionKey(f,GA→B) is a re-encryption of message m under GB with deg(f ′) ≤ b′.
Furthermore, Re-encryptionKey(f,GA→B) adds a noise of bit size log log(q)+ b log(n+1)+log(y)+
|e′max|, where |e′max| is the maximum bit size of the noise in any of the f ′i ’s.
Proof. Let f be an encryption of a message m under the key GA and GA→B be a re-encryption
key generated using Algorithm 8. We want to show that Re-encryption(f,GA→B) is an encryption
of a message m under the key GB. Let then m be a monomial of f , and c be the coefficient of m
in f , represented as an integer in (−b q2c, b q2c]. To simplify the notation, we set t = log2(b q2c). By
definition, we can write c ·m = s(c) ·∑t−1j=0 cj · 2j ·m, the cj ’s being the binary decomposition of the
absolute value of c, and s(c) ∈ {−1,+1} the sign of c. It is clear that Re-encryption will transform
each term c ·m (c is a constant and m is a monomial) as follows:
Re-encryptionKey(c ·m,GA→B) = s(c) ·
t−1∑
j=0
cj ·GA→B[2j ·m].
For any 0 ≤ j < t, by definition we have: GA→B[2j ·m] = f ′2j ·m + 2j · (m mod GA), where the f ′2j ·m
are as in Algorithm 8. Since P/IA = P/IB, it holds that (m mod GA) ∈ P/IB. As a consequence,
each GA→B[2j ·m] mod GB is a noisy encoding of 2j(m mod GA). More precisely,
Re-encryptionKey(c ·m,GA→B) mod GB =
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
cj
(
f ′2j ·m + 2
j(m mod GA)
) mod GB
=
c · (m mod GA) + s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
cjf
′
2j ·m
) mod GB
= c · (m mod GA) + s(c) ·
t−1∑
j=0
(
2 cje
′
2j ·m
)
,
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where 2 e′
2j ·m is the noisy part of f
′
2j ·m, namely 2 e
′
2j ·m = f
′
2j ·m mod GB. Now, for any polynomial
f , we denote by T(f) the terms of f . Recall that a term is a monomial times a constant. We have
Re-encryptionKey(f,GA→B) =
∑
c·m∈T(f) Re-encryptionKey(c ·m,GA→B) =
∑
c·m∈T(f)
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
cjf
′
2j ·m
)
+ c · (m mod GA)
 .
Hence, Re-encryptionKey(f,GA→B) mod GB =
∑
c·m∈T(f) Re-encryptionKey(c ·m,GA→B) mod GB
=
∑
c·m∈T(f)
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
cjf
′
2j ·m
)
+ c · (m mod GA)
 mod GB
=
∑
c·m∈T(f)
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
2 cje
′
2j ·m
)
+ c · (m mod GA)

=
∑
c·m∈T(f)
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
2 cje
′
2j ·m
)+ ∑
c·m∈T(f)
c · (m mod GA)
=
∑
c·m∈T(f)
s(c) · t−1∑
j=0
(
2 cje
′
2j ·m
)+ 2e+ m = 2e′ + m,
where e′ =
∑
c·m∈T(f)
(
s(c) ·∑t−1j=0 (2 cje′2j ·m))+2e ∈ P/IB. Also, note that m+2e = ∑c·m∈T(f) c ·
(m mod GA) = f mod GA holds because of the additive/multiplication-by-a-constant homomorphic
features of the encryption scheme. All elements in GA→B are of degree at most b′. Hence, the degree
of the output of Algorithm 9 is at most b′.
Finally, if |e′max| is the maximal bit size of noise in any of the f ′i used to generate GA→B by
Algorithm 8, then entries of GA→B have maximal noise of bit size log(y) + |e′max|. Now, given a
polynomial of degree b, Algorithm 9 performs at most log(q)
(
n+b
b
) ≤ log(q) (n + 1)b additions of
polynomials with noise of size log(y)+ |e′max|. The bit size of the noise added in Algorithm 9 will be
(log log(q) + b log(n+ 1) + log(y) + |e′max|). Additionally, Algorithm 9 will “copy” the noise from
f . uunionsq
For the security, we first discuss re-encryption under the same key, i.e. when GA = GB. If b = b
′,
the key GA→A can be publicly constructed given access to encryptions of zero by requesting a fresh
encryption of zero f and storing GA→A[2j ·m] = 2j ·m+f . Since (f mod I) = 2e for some small error
term e, it holds that f+2j ·m mod I = (2j ·m mod I)+2e. Hence, GA→A is a correct re-encryption
key which can be generated given access only to encryptions of zero, and no additional information
is leaked. This implies a limited form of key-dependent message security in the standard model:
the least significant bits of the constant terms of the Gro¨bner basis elements are encrypted.
However, this argument does not go through for b > b′. While it is easy to construct elements f ′
which satisfy f ′ mod I ≈ 2j ·m mod I for m a monomial of degree at least b′ + 1 and at most b
with access to encryptions of zero, it is not easy to produce such an element f ′ with degree ≤ b′ and
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small noise. Yet, for GA → GB with GA 6= GB security of re-encryption can be shown under the
WIMN assumption. That is, any adversary breaking the IND-CPA security of the scheme with access
to the re-encryption key GA→B can be turned into an adversary breaking the IMN problem. A full
proof of this for the special case of LWE is presented in [18], where this technique was independently
proposed.
9 Parameters
Picking parameters for SPCN essentially reduces to fulfilling our correctness requirements and
to ensuring that the linearised LWE instance is hard. We emphasise that a public-key version of
SPCN is not competitive with Ring-LWE based schemes which have a public-key at least a factor
of N =
(
n+b
b
)
smaller. Furthermore, recent constructions apply additional techniques to manage
parameter growth as the multiplication depth increases such as modulus switching, which we do
not consider in this work. However, for completeness, we now give concrete suggestions for various
parameters that are involved in our scheme. This section is to be understood as a sanity check
showing how all parts fit together and not as a proposal of SPCN as a contender for an efficient
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme – it could not be such a contender as it attempts to
provide a more unified view on such schemes.
We denote by µ the maximal degree of the Boolean polynomials corresponding to the circuits that
we wish to support, and by λ the security parameter as before. One restriction on our choice of
parameters is imposed by the requirement that decryption error probability on evaluated ciphertexts
should be low. Since additions have a small effect on the noise, we concentrate on the degree of
polynomials. This means that in order to allow for polynomials of degree up to µ and at most
a, say, 2−20 decryption error probability, we must have Pr [|eµ| ≥ q/2 : e←$ χ] < 2−20. Hence (cf.
Section 7) we need to ensure that
exp(k2/2) > 220 and k(αq) < 1/2 · µ√q.
Another set of restrictions comes from the conditions stated in our intractability assumption in
Definition 18, i.e. that the linearised LWE instance should be hard. For this, we make the somewhat
arbitrary choice of b = 2 and denote by N =
(
n+b
b
)
=
(
n+2
2
)
the number of monomials in a
fresh ciphertext. We pick d = 1 because this case is best understood and allows for multiplicative
homomorphicity. We set the parameters in a way which keeps q independent of b and allow for
dependency on λ and µ only. (This is compatible with the definitional framework that we have set
up.) We pick:
q ≈ λ(2+µ) and α = 1/(λµ log2(λ)
√
λ).
Under these choices, we now have to establish the conditions under which the LWE instance char-
acterised by N , q and χα,q is hard. Since a detailed treatment of algorithms for solving LWE is
out of scope for this work, we here restrict ourselves to a simple distinguishing attack for which
we follow [49]. Denote by Λ the lattice spanned by our linearised polynomials and by ΛT its dual
lattice scaled by q. For the distinguishing attack we need a vector of length 1/α in the dual lattice
38
ΛT , i.e. we require a lattice reduction algorithm with root hermite factor δ satisfying:
1/α = δm · det(ΛT )
1/α = δm · qN/m
δ = (1/α · qN/m)1/m.
We want to ensure that achieving this δ costs at least 2λ operations. We set m =
√
n · log q/ log δ
[52] and assume λ ≈ 1.8/ log δ−110 [49] to be compatible with related work. This allows to estimate
parameters for SPCN . To turn it into a public-key scheme, we may use a standard symmetric-to-
assymetric conversion. In particular, picking strategy (A) from Section 5, we require 2N log2 q
encryptions of zero. Putting all this together, we arrive at the example choices of parameters given
in Table 1 which was generated using the reference implementation from Section 10.
λ µ n N log2 α log2 q log2 ‖sk‖ log2 ‖enc‖ log2 ‖pk‖
40 1 11 78 -7.48 11.27 6.95 9.78 20.56
40 2 15 136 -12.81 16.94 7.99 11.17 23.34
40 3 18 190 -18.13 22.16 8.64 12.04 25.08
40 4 21 253 -23.45 27.19 9.16 12.75 26.50
40 5 23 300 -28.77 32.64 9.55 13.26 27.52
80 1 18 190 -8.48 12.96 7.87 11.27 23.53
80 2 18 190 -14.80 19.60 8.46 11.86 24.73
80 3 22 276 -21.13 25.97 9.16 12.81 26.61
80 4 25 351 -27.45 32.38 9.66 13.47 27.94
80 5 29 465 -33.77 38.32 10.12 14.12 29.24
128 1 26 378 -9.11 14.04 8.51 12.37 25.75
128 2 25 351 -16.11 21.28 9.06 12.87 26.73
128 3 25 351 -23.11 28.61 9.48 13.29 27.59
128 4 29 465 -30.11 35.77 10.02 14.02 29.04
128 5 33 595 -37.11 42.62 10.46 14.63 30.26
Table 1. Example parameter choices for b = 2, k =
√
2 log(220) and N =
(
n+2
2
)
. The column
log2 ‖sk‖ expresses the logarithm of the bitsize of the secret key, the column log2 ‖enc‖ the logarithm
of the bitsie of a fresh ciphertext, the column log2 ‖pk‖ the logarithm of the bitsize of the public
key. For SPCN the last column is ignored.
From Table 1 it is easy to see that SPCN and its public-key variant only supports very limited levels
of multiplicative homomorphicity. This is to be expected, as the public key has size O ((N log q)2)
with q ≈ λ2+µ, i.e. O ((Nµ)2).
10 Reference Implementation
We implemented our scheme using the Sage mathematics software [62].5 Although this implemen-
tation is not efficient, the code not only concretely demonstrates the correctness of the scheme, it
also shows that if basic mathematical structures are available, it can be easily implemented.
5 See https://bitbucket.org/malb/research-snippets/src/tip/noisy-polly-cracker.py .
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